Market Impact of International Sporting and Cultural Events by António Miguel Martins & Ana Paula Serra
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿  ￿   ￿   ￿   ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!
" ￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿# ￿# ￿# ￿#$%&  ￿ $%&  ￿ $%&  ￿ $%&  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $&&’ $&&’ $&&’ $&&’￿
￿￿
￿





António Miguel Martins* 
and 






* Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto 
** (corresponding author) CEMPRE, Faculdade de Economia da 
Universidade do Porto, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto, Portugal 
Tel: +35122 557 1255, Fax +35122 550 5050, Email: aserra@fep.up.pt
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
† Ana Paula Serra acknowledges the generous support of CEMPRE - Centro de Estudos Macroeconómicos e 
Previsão -  a research unit financed by FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Portugal through 
Programa Operacional Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação (POCTI) of Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III, which 
is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. ￿ ￿￿
 
Abstract 
This  paper  investigates  the  impact  of  international  sporting  and  cultural  events  on  national  stock 
markets. We study market reaction to the announcements of the selected country hosting mega-events 
such as the Olympic Games, the World and the European Football Cups and World Exhibitions. First, 
we evaluate the abnormal returns of winning bidders at (and around) the announcement date at market 
and industry-levels. Second, we analyze the determinants of the variation in abnormal returns across 
events and industries and control for the prior probability of observing the event. Third, on the basis of 
a simple model of partial anticipation, we reexamine the abnormal returns observed for the winning 
and losing countries. Our initial results suggest that the abnormal returns are not consistently different 
from  zero.  Further,  when  we  look  at  particular  industries,  we  find  no  evidence  supporting  that 
industries, that a priori were more likely to extract direct benefits from the event, observe positive 
significant effects. Yet  when we control for the prior expectations, the announcement of these mega-
events is associated with a positive stock market reaction in the nominated country and a negative 
reaction in the losing country. Overall we interpret our findings as supportive of rational asset pricing 
and partial anticipation. 
 
Keywords: Market efficiency; Event studies; Mega-events. 
 
JEL classification:  G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies  




This paper investigates the impact of international sporting and cultural events on the stock 
markets of host countries. These are mega, one-time events entailing large public and private 
investments. 
 
Why should we observe a market reaction to the announcement of such mega events and of 
what  magnitude? Two  main competing  arguments  predict  that  these events  produce  non-
negative abnormal returns as of the announcement date.  
 
Assuming that the event was not anticipated, under the null hypothesis of efficient markets, 
positive  or  negative  abnormal  returns  would  reflect  that  investors  anticipate  that  this 
(unexpected) news has a positive/negative valuation effect on the market capitalization of 
listed firms (Fama, 1965). Assuming managers maximize shareholders’ value, only positive 
NPV projects would be undertaken, and market prices would adjust upwards the event-related 
news.  Further,  anticipation  of  (net)  economic-wide  benefits  driven  by  event-related 
international exposure, public infrastructure improvements, and multiplier effects of the initial 
revenues would result in a positive impact for the aggregate market. Variation in abnormal 
returns  across  firms  (or  industries)  would  reflect  the  differential  net  benefit  each  firm 
(industry) would extract from the event.  
 
Alternatively, market reaction to winning news could reflect a national positive sentiment 
caused by pride, self-esteem or joy associated with the fact that the country was chosen to 
host and sometimes organize an international (most of the times) worldwide broadcasted and 
recognizably important event.  In contrast, the first explanation assumes that investors are 
rational  and  predicts  that,  when  sentiment  is  not  associated  with  any  tangible  economic 
effects, this news will produce no effect on market prices. 
 
The market reaction on the day an event is announced may not accurately measure the true 
economic impact of the events if investors anticipate the event will occur (Malatesta and 
Thompson, 1985). The magnitude of the effects observed should be of smaller magnitude and, 
the  greater  the  anticipation,  the  lower  the  impact  as  of  the  announcement  date.  This  is ￿ ￿￿
particularly true for the events we study because in most instances the outcome is at least 
partially anticipated by investors. 
 
Both  arguments  above  predict  that  winning  (losing)  countries  observe  positive  (negative) 
market returns. Rational arguments predict that the effect should be asymmetric for winners 
and losers and across events, because the perceived economic impact can vary widely across 
countries. In a different way, behavioral arguments maintain that, if prices are affected by 
investor sentiment, regardless of the objective probability of observing the event and of the 
economic impact of the investment, we should observe a market rise in wins and a market 
decline in losses. Further, the fact that investors extract more pain from bad news than the joy 
they sense when a good outcome is revealed, can motivate different market reactions for 
winning and losing countries, and the magnitude of the effect would therefore be greater for 
losers than for winners. When the event is not anticipated at all, i.e. event-news is a complete 
surprise, and investors are rational, the impact should be felt only on the winner’s market 
value.  In  reality  this  scenario  is  rather  implausible:  mega-events  location  decisions  are 
complex  ongoing  processes  that  involve  several  rounds  of  negotiation and/or  voting,  and 
require active bidding and intense business plans preparation from the countries or cities that 
take part in the contest. Moreover in a few cases there is only one candidacy and thus the 
announcement conveys no news. 
 
Stock market impact is not the same thing as overall economic impact and we do not intend to 
capture or test here the economy-wide benefits attributable to such events. Regardless of a 
positive or negative overall economic impact, individual stocks (and industry indices) may 
register positive abnormal returns. The same goes for the effects observed in aggregate market 
indices: even if investors are rational, an event yielding negative economy-wide effects does 
not have necessarily to have a similar correspondence in the stock market. Aggregate market 
returns are value-weighted averages of its individual constituent stocks’ returns and, while the 
event may be damaging for economic growth, listed firms (and industries), that potentially 
extract direct benefits from the organization of the event such as tourism and infrastructure-
related industries, may observe positive market returns;  if they represent an important share 
of the stock market, significant positive market returns for the aggregate index may occur. 
Alternatively, the event may be perceived as economically neutral for listed firms, and yet the ￿ ￿￿
market register positive or negative valuations due merely to market sentiment or investor 
myopia. It is difficult to predict a priori the sign and magnitude of market returns and relate 
them directly to the overall economic impact of the event. Yet one can outline hypotheses 
motivated by the competing theoretical arguments, and test them upon the observed zero/non-
zero, positive/negative abnormal returns, symmetrical/asymmetrical effects for winning and 
losing countries and the cross-sectional variation of returns across events. 
 
In  any  case,  an  important  question  is  whether  investors  evaluate  these  mega-events 
announcements as positive news to the companies more directly involved, and in general, to 
the economy of the host country. Countries and cities strongly compete to host international 
sporting and cultural events, and provide public funding, on the basis of the positive effects 
on the country’s economy brought about by these events. Organizers claim that there are not 
only immediate increases in spending (direct and induced) but also further future economic 
benefits related with the infrastructure investments and international exposure. There is a lot 
of controversy about the true economic success of these events and about what they stand for. 
Several authors suggest that the true impact may be substantially lower than the one estimated 
in ex ante models. In fact, ex-post studies highlight that not only are the direct benefits lower 
(because  of  improper  measurement  of  benefits  and  costs),  but  also  that  there  is  lack  of 
empirical evidence demonstrating that the international exposure and the publicity associated 
with the event have any impact in improving the country or region for tourism or business. As 
for the companies more directly involved, previous literature suggests that stock prices tend to 
respond favorably to announcements of major capital investments. 
 
We  study stock market reaction to  the announcement of the selected country hosting the 
Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the European Football Cup 
and  World  and  Specialized  Exhibitions.  We  also  measure  the  market  effects  of  the 
announcement of the nomination of the European Cultural City.  
 
First, we evaluate the abnormal returns of winning bidders on (and around) the announcement 
date using an event study methodology. We study the impact at market and industry-levels. 
Second, we analyze the determinants of the variation in abnormal returns across events and 
industries on the basis of a set of variables found important by previous studies and control ￿ ￿￿
for the prior probability of observing the event. Third, on the basis of a simple model of 
partial  anticipation,  we  reexamine  the  abnormal  returns  observed  for  winning  and  losing 
countries and perform a series of tests to disentangle the different theoretical arguments that 
could account for the observed stock market behavior. 
 
Using a cross-section of 81 winning countries, we find that the abnormal returns measured at 
the announcement date are not consistently different from  zero. We also  document stock 
market reaction over several other event-windows and again results are inconclusive.  Further, 
the CARs for losers are not statistically significant. When we look at particular industries, we 
find no evidence supporting that industries, that a priori were more likely to extract direct 
benefits from the event, observe stronger effects. Overall, non parametric tests seem to be 
more powerful but results are mixed. The results of the cross-sectional analysis confirm some 
of the relations we predict. In particular, we document that abnormal returns are lower (in 
absolute terms) for winners and losers when the outcome is predictable. Overall we interpret 
our findings as supportive of rational asset pricing and partial anticipation. The results suggest 
further that non-trivial benefits exist but these are specific to particular events and countries. 
Thus,  no  general  statement can  be made  regarding  the  economic  merit  of  hosting  mega-
events. 
 
This study is related with several strands of the finance and economic literature. We focus on 
the literature of information and market efficiency. Another strand of literature directly related 
to this paper is the impact of sentiment on asset prices that we indirectly address. Our results 
are  also  of  interest  to  other  empirical  economic  research  areas  such  as  economic  impact 
studies  of  large  capital  investments  and  public  investment  in  infrastructures,  and  sports, 
recreation and tourism studies. 
 
The main contribution of our paper is to perform rigorous study of market reaction to the 
announcement  of  mega-events.  Previous  studies  focus  on  one  particular  event  and 
consequently do not have the opportunity to explore the cross-sectional variation in abnormal 
returns. Because we analyze a large number of events, we improve statistical significance and 
are able to explore the determinants of cross-sectional variation across events. In addition we 
study different types of events that can be grouped in two major classes, sporting and cultural ￿ ￿￿
events. On top of that, unlike most of the previous studies, we control for partial anticipation 
and evaluate the effects for winning and loosing countries. Our study generalizes previous 
results, investigates the determinants of the observed market impact and controls for the ex-
ante probability of a country being a successful bidder. 
 
While we do not address directly the overall economic benefits of these events, it is possible 
to draw some policy implications regarding the merit of (funding) these events. Given the 
limitations of traditional economic impact ex ante studies (and because the implementation of 
more comprehensive and rigorous techniques may be, in most cases, impracticable), event-
studies looking at the market reaction to nominations may be a useful tool to indirectly assess 
the benefits of the organization of these events. Yet, the results of the event-study analysis 
have be read very carefully given that the observed abnormal returns may be contaminated by 
investor sentiment. 
 
The  remainder  of  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  relevant  related 
literature.  Section  3  presents  the  testable  hypotheses.  Section  4  presents  the  data  and 
methodology. In Section 5 we present and discuss our main findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS FINDINGS  
 
2.1. Overall economic impact of mega-events 
 
Dwyer, Forsyth and Spurr (2005) refer mega-events as one-time or recurring events of limited 
duration. Mega-event projects entail large construction projects (infrastructural, productive or 
not) and operational costs.
1,  2 Economic impact studies (or economic impact assessments), 
most of the times sponsored by promoters, claim these mega projects are very positive NPV 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 For example, Germany spent over 1,4 billion euros building or rehabilitating 12 stadiums for the 2006 Soccer World Cup of 
which 35% were funded by taxes (cited by Matheson, 2006). For the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games, “due for 
completion are: a dozen Olympic sports centres; a new cross-city underground railway; a host of office towers; a massive 
airport terminal; and, after some delay and much criticism, a colossal French-designed egg-shaped theatre in the city centre”, 
The Economist, March 1, 2007. 
2 For example, Greece spent over 1 billion euros in the 2004 Olympic Summer Games on security (cited by Matheson, 2006). ￿ ￿￿
projects and there seems to be a lot of interest in hosting these events.
3 Yet several studies 
suggest that not only are the input estimates optimistic but the typical methodology to assess 
ex-ante event-related economic returns, input-output models, fail to correctly account for the 
revenues  that  are  attributable  to  the  event.
4, 
5  To  properly  assess  how  much  growth  is 
attributable to the event, one has to a) control for “substitution” and “crowding-out” effects
6 - 
even when demand is mostly non-resident or even foreign -; b) incorporate multipliers that 
reflect eventual “leakages to other countries”;
7 and c) account for the impact in taxation or 
government borrowing.
8 More refined models propose using a series of relevant variables, 
proxy factors for local growth determinants, to project the level of economic activity in the 
absence of the event. Comparing this estimate with the actual level of activity will tell us ex 
post what the effective contribution of the event was. In other words, deviations from average 
national (or local) growth or historical growth, that are not explained by deviations in costs of 
production or demand side variables, should be attributed to the event. 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
3 Matheson (2006) refers that a typical impact study usually involves estimates of the direct and induced impact: “the number 
of visitors an event is expected to draw, the number of days each spectator is expected to stay, and the amount each visitor 
will spend each day (…) subjected to a multiplier, usually around two (…). The total impact is double the size of the initial 
spending”.   
4 Dwyer, Forsyth and Spurr (2005) propose a more comprehensive computable generating equilibrium model (CGE) to assess 
the economic impact of such events. 
5 “Officials estimate that the Olympics have been contributing more than two percentage points to Beijing' s annual growth 
since 2003. After the games, they insist, the city' s new infrastructure and additional glamour (including the egg-shaped 
theatre,  which  hopes  to attract  international stars)  will  help keep  the economy  rolling.  The  flow  of  investment  will  be 
sustained, they say, by further infrastructure development, and by the pent-up demand for property, which will be supported 
by a continuing large influx of migrants from the countryside.”, The Economist, March 1, 2007. 
6 Ex-ante effects often ignore “substitution” and “crowding-out” effects. For example, local residents that are willing to join 
the event activities may not spend as much in other leisure activities and/or cut leisure travel to other cities in the country. On 
the other hand, due to the fixed number of hotel rooms and high prices or simply to avoid the event crowd, regular tourists 
and business travelers may prefer to go elsewhere and these lost visitors may have more attractive spending patterns. 
7 To estimate the output and jobs generated by the additional demand brought about by the event it is necessary to take in 
consideration whether inputs are variable or fixed. There could be capacity constraints in factors such as labor. For example, 
in many of these events, infrastructure building requires using resources that were required by other activities or hiring 
foreign workers whose subsequent spending patterns may be atypical. The benefits may not go all to the host country but to 
foreign neighbor countries or multinationals and there could be damages to other productive sectors in the economy. For 
example, all the 16 the official partners for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany were multinationals and only two were 
German. Yet all the official suppliers were German companies.  
8  Public  funding  is  often  required  for  the  event  infrastructures.  This  could  imply  that  other  potential  more  productive 
investments are not funded (or postponed) or taxes have to rise (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). Those public expenditures 
may or not have positive impact on the economy. Sporting events specialized infrastructures such as stadiums or swimming 
pools have a limited use and potentially benefit only a small part of the tax payers that paid for it. More general construction 
projects, for example, related with the World Expositions, such as cities core redevelopment and infrastructure building may 
benefit more directly the country or local community. Similarly, the benefits from investing in cultural or lifestyle amenities 
such as theatres and first-rate architecture museums, or urban parks, biking and foot trails, can attract highly educated and 
creative young people that are essential to economic growth.  ￿ ￿￿
There is some controversy regarding the economy-wide impact of mega-events in the host 
countries.  The  impact  is  measured  frequently  by  changes  in  personal  income,  per  capita 
personal income, employment and taxable sales or sale taxes collections. Academic studies 
that analyze the ex post effects of these mega-events confirm that ex ante estimates are overly 
optimistic. For example, Baade and Matheson (2004) present an ex post analysis of the 1994 
World Cup in the U.S. and find that several cities did in fact experience significant losses in 
contrast  with  the  gains  estimated  by  the  tournament  promoters.
9  The  most  recent  and 
sophisticated ex post studies, seem to suggest no consistent positive statistically significant 
net  economic  benefits  (Matheson,  2006).
10  In  any  case,  several  authors  notice  that  it  is 
difficult to isolate the impact of the event and given that it is likely to be small relative to the 
overall economy, one may not be able reject the null of no economic benefits even if true 
benefits occur. 
 
2.2. Market impact of investment decisions 
 
The extensive event study literature focusing on announcement effects provides evidence that, 
on average, stock price reaction is consistent with market efficiency: prices rapidly and fully 
adjust to the release of new corporate information.
11 
 
2.2.1  Market reaction to major capital investments 
Capital expenditures decisions are the key financial decisions in terms of contribution to firm-
value  (Miller  and  Modigliani,  1958).  Under  the  null  hypothesis  of  efficient  markets,  the 
announcement effects  on  market  prices  should reflect  the  significance of  any  unexpected 
news that influence cash flows or discount rates (McQueen and Roley, 1993). Stock prices at 
time t are given by: 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
9 The authors suggest that host cities accumulated losses of US$ 5,5 to US$9,3 billions as opposed to the US$4 billion gain 
estimated by the organizers. 
10 Please refer to Matheson (2006) for an extensive survey of ex ante and ex post economic impact studies (tables 1 and  2). 
11 For throughout reviews, see, for example,  Fama (1991) and Dimson and Mussavian (1998). Several recent studies present 
evidence contrary to market efficiency suggesting either overshooting in prices or gradual information dissemination. In 
recent years several behavioral finance models have been proposed to account for overreaction and underreaction but no 




















t W          (1) 
  
where  
Dt+￿ are the expected dividends at time t+￿; 
tRt+￿ is the expected discount rate at time t+￿; and  
E[./￿t] are the conditional expectations upon the available information set ￿ at time t. 
     
Theoretically there are three alternative stock market reactions to announcements of capital 
expenditures plans (Woolridge and Snow (1990 and Burton, Lonie and Power (1999)): 
-  the  first  hypothesis  predicts  a  positive  market  reaction  on  the  assumption  that 
managers  maximize  shareholder  wealth  and  undertake  positive-NPV  projects;  hence  the 
larger the economic valued added by these projects, the larger the positive impact. A zero or 
negative effect requires that these announcements are not fully anticipated and managers only 
engage in positive NPV projects.  
- the second hypothesis predicts that the impact of the announcements is null because 
investors have perfect foresight and fully anticipate future positive NPV projects; therefore 
prices incorporate its net benefits even before new capital expenditures are announced. The 
market value of a company would already reflect the impact of these or other investments that 
the firm would have to pursue to maintain its (anticipated) competitive advantages. Under this 
hypothesis, the fact that the market does not react to the announcements is not informative 
about the economic merit of these mega-events; 
- finally the third hypothesis predicts that the impact of the announcements of capital 
investments is negative based on the assumption that investors are myopic. As such, they pay 
too much attention to short-term earnings and penalize long-term capital investments. 
 
Previous empirical literature finds support to the first hypothesis: on average, stock prices 
seem to respond favorably to announcements of individual firms major capital investments.
12 
Further,  the  stock  market  reaction  is  greater,  the  level  of  new  investments  announced. 
McConnell  and  Muscarella  (1985)  show  that  firms’  stock  market  responses  to  capital 
expenditures  announcements  reflect  their  investment  opportunities.  Similarly,  Bloose  and 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
12 See, for example, Woolridge and Snow (1990), Jones, Danboldt and Hirst (2000) and Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) and 
references therein. ￿ ￿￿
Shieh  (1997)  show  the  market  response  is  larger  to  announcements  of  firms  with  good 
investment  opportunities.  Yet  Titman  et  al.  (2004)  show  that  increased  investment 
expenditures  may  be  associated  with  negative  stock  returns  reflecting  that  investors 




Mega-events announcements may produce a  short-term impact on the stock prices  of the 
listed companies that may benefit directly from the event such as construction and building 
materials,  tourism-related, communications and media companies.
14 More long-term effects 
could also arise due to general multiplier effects and, even more important, as a result of 
country projection.  Merton (1987) refers to changes in investor recognition as a source of 
value.  Investors  only  invest  in  the  assets  they  are  aware  and  require  higher  returns  to 
compensate for the shadow cost of incomplete information. Organizing a large event such as 
the Olympic games, can overrun that cost and, through an expansion of shareholders’ base, 
lead to a decrease in required returns translating into higher stock market valuations. The 
increased  exposure  to  international  media  may  also  produce  long  term  benefits  through 
increased tourism receipts in the years after the event. 
 
Veraros, Kasimati and Dawson (2004) examine the effect of the announcement of the hosting 
city for the 2004 Olympic games on the stock exchange of Greece and Italy and finds a 
significant positive effect on the Athens Stock Exchange as well as on the stock prices of 
infrastructure-related companies.
15 Yet no (negative) effect is observed for the losing country 
stock market (Milan Stock Exchange). 
 
2.2.3. Partially-anticipated events 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
13 Related with this is what is sometimes designated by Capital Myopia that refers to excessive investments pursued by 
companies that erroneously believe that there is scope for further profitable capital investments ignoring that competition will 
drive away economic rents. If investors anticipate that, a negative market reaction may be observed. 
 
14 Preto (2004) analyses the impact of the 2004 UEFA European Football Championship on listed Portuguese companies. The 
author identifies six companies that could benefit directly from the event. These are Portugal Telecom (telecommunications), 
Brisa  (motorways),  Impresa  (media),  Sonaecom  (mobile  operator),  Ibersol  (fast-food  restaurant  chain)  and  BPI  (banks, 
official event sponsor).   
15 A similar study conducted by G. Berman, R. Brooks and S. Davidson (“The Sydney Olympic Games announcement and 
the Australian Stock market react”, Applied Economic Letters, 2000, Vol. 7, pp. 781-84), cited by Veraros et al. (2004) found 
no significance effect on the overall market, and only limited effects on stock prices of infrastructure development companies 
based in New South Wales where the Olympic Games were hosted. ￿ ￿￿
Stock price changes on the announcement date may only reflect a part of the overall effect of 
an event if investors partially anticipate the event. Market reaction to announcements depends 
on investors’ perception of the likelihood of the event. Variation in market reaction to the 
announcement  of  a  particular  event  may  merely  reflect  the  degree  of  anticipation.  The 
announcement effect is most of the times smaller than the economic impact of the event and 
failure  to  document  significant  announcement  returns  may  be  explained  by  partial 
anticipation. Stock prices may as well reflect investor disappointment if investors had prior 
expectations  on  the  occurrence  of  events  with  positive  value  than  do  not  materialize 
(Malatesta and Thomson, 1985).  Several studies have estimated the likelihood of observing 
an event based upon firms characteristics and found that the extent of market reaction is 
affected by investors’ prior expectations.
16  
 
2.2.4. Investor sentiment 
Several  authors  document  that  changes  in  investor  mood  are  associated  with  changes  in 
market prices. Thus, prices could move regardless of the true economic impact of these events 
or  the  degree  of  anticipation  associated.  Recent  literature  shows  that  events  that  have  a 
general  impact  on  investor  sentiment,  such  as  national  team  soccer  results,  produce 
statistically and economically significant returns. For example, Edmans, Garcia and Norli 
(2007) find that a loss in World Cup leads to a next-day abnormal return of -38 basis points, 
and claim that this loss effect is driven by investor sentiment. 
 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 
We evaluate the following hypotheses: 
(i) The announcement of a mega event such as the Olympics, the World Football Cup, the 
European Football Cup or the World Exposition is associated with a positive market reaction 
on the nominated country stock exchange.
17 
A  significant positive  average market reaction for the winning country is consistent with 
shareholder value maximization but could also reflect investors’ sentiment. A negative market 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
16  See, for example, Acharya (1993) or Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (2004) and references therein. 
17 The statistical null hypothesis tested in Section 5 is that the impact of the announcement of the event is null and so forth 
for the other hypotheses. 
 ￿ ￿￿
reaction for the winning country may reflect either that investors are myopic, or that managers 
invest  in  negative  NPV  projects  for  their  own  benefits.  A  null  impact  may  reflect  that 
investors have fully anticipated the effects of the event.
18 
 
 (ii) The announcement of a mega event such as the Olympics, the World Soccer Cup, the 
European Soccer Cup or the World Exposition is associated with a negative market reaction 
on the losing country stock exchange. 
A  significant  negative  market  reaction  for  the  losing  country  is  consistent  with  either 
shareholder  value  maximization  when  there  is  partial  anticipation,  or  reflect  investors’ 
sentiment.  The  positive/negative  effects  can  be  asymmetric  reflecting  that  there  are 
differential  net  potential  benefits  for  the  economies  of  the  winning/losing  countries.  A 
stronger (negative) effect for losing countries is consistent with behavioral arguments. 
 
(iii) Individual industries that potentially benefit more from the event exhibit higher market 
reaction. 
A similar price impact across industries, regardless of the potential economic benefits they 
can extract from the event, is consistent with investor sentiment arguments. 
 
(iv) Abnormal returns (for the winning countries) vary across events and industries and are 
driven by the relative importance of the event (relative to the underlying economy), the time-
span between the announcement and the realization of the event, and the degree of partial 
anticipation. 
Significant  differences  in  the  cross-section  of  abnormal  returns  are  evidence  against 




18 A null impact may also reflect that the effects are trivial. ￿ ￿￿
The predictions of the different theoretical arguments are as follows: 
Theoretical Arguments   









￿ aggregate stock market impact 
 




￿ aggregate stock market impact 
 
Winning and Losing countries 
￿ variation across markets/events 
related to 
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4. DATA AND EMPIRICAL TESTS 
 
In  this  section  we  describe  the  tests  we  propose  to  evaluate  these  hypotheses  and  to 




Announcement dates were gathered from several sources (through mail contact or  websites): 
IOC (International Olympic Committee) for the Summer and Winter Olympic Games; FIFA 
(Fedération  Internationale  de  Football  Association)  for  the  World  Football  Cups;  UEFA 
(Union des Associations Européennes de Football) for the European Football Cups; Bureau 
International  des  Expositions  for  the  World  and  Specialized  Exhibitions;  and  the  EC 
(European Commission) for the European Capitals of Culture. Please refer to appendix A for 
details. ￿ ￿￿
 
The sampling criterion was availability of daily of country and industry indices returns with at 
least half a year before the event. The final sample consists of 81 announcements.
19 Table 
A.1. in appendix  lists the announcement dates. The first announcement date is May 16, 1955 
and refers to the 1960 Summer Olympic Games hosted by Italy. The last announcement date 
in our sample is July 2, 2003 and refers to the 2010 Winter Olympic Games that will be 
hosted by Canada. The average lag between the announcement and the realization of the 
mega.events for the 81 events is 57.5 months. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the events analyzed by type of event and by organizing 
country.
20  Our  sample  includes  6  Summer  Olympic  Games  (1984  onwards),  8  Winter 
Olympic  Games  (1988  onwards),  6  World  Football  Cups  (1990  onwards),  10  European 
Football Cups (1984 onwards), 11 World Exhibitions (1982 onwards), 10 Specialized World 
Exhibitions (1980 onwards) and 30 European Capitals of Culture (1986 onwards). Even after 
excluding  the  European  Capitals  of  Culture,  Europe  has  been  the  most  successful  venue 
attracting these events. Worldwide, by country, the US is the top organizer followed by Japan, 
Canada, Germany and Italy. 
 
We also gathered information for the losing candidacies when available. This information, 
shown in table 2, was only available for a subset of events and dates.
21 The most active (not 
successful) bidder is Canada followed by Sweden.  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
19 Some events are co-organized by two or more countries. For example Belgium and Netherlands organized the 2000 
European Football Cup together. In that case we consider them as separate observations. 
20  There  are a  few  cases for  which  there  is  no  market  information  for  the  winning country  when  the  nomination  was 
announced. For example, this is true for the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in the former Soviet-Union or the 1988 Winter 
Olympic Games in Korea.  
21 Stock market information was not available for several losing countries by the time of the nomination announcement (for 
example, China, in respect to the 2000 Summer Olympic Games or Morocco, in respect to the 1998 and 2002 World Football 
Cups).  ￿ ￿￿
Returns for the winning and losing countries were obtained from Datastream and computed 
using a total return index measured in US dollars.
22 
 
For the multivariate analysis we use GDP and industrial production index data from IMF. 
Market capitalization data was obtained from Datastream. The Olympic Games voting results 
for the several rounds were obtained from Lyberg, Wolf "Fabulous 100 years of the IOC; 
facts,  figures  and  much,  much  more",  Lausanne,  1996,  pp.  308-313  and  from  the  IOC 
website.  The  World  Football  Cup  voting  results  were  provided  by  FIFA.  Appendix  A 
describes the voting procedures. Table 3 summarizes the voting results for the winning and 
the losing second more voted countries over the several rounds.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
4.2. Empirical framework 
 
First we use a traditional event study approach to evaluate hypotheses (i), (ii), and (iii). For 
each market (or industry within a market) we estimate expected returns on the basis of a 
selected  return  generating  process; then,  we compute abnormal returns at and around the 
announcement  date  (and  obtain  variance/covariance  information);  we  aggregate  abnormal 
returns across markets and infer about the average effect.
23 Second, we run cross-sectional 
regressions of the abnormal returns on the variables potentially influencing the magnitude of 
the market reaction to the mega-event announcements (and evaluate hypothesis iv). Third, we 





22 Datastream indices were preferred over other domestic market and industry indices when available because they are 
constructed on a uniform basis across markets and are not backfilled with firms added or deleted from the index. The 
exception was the total return series for Spain general index (IBEX) obtained directly from Bolsa de Madrid.   
23 To estimate and infer about the average impact of the event several other frameworks could be used. For example, one 
could jointly estimate, for each market, the return generating process parameters using time-series and the event impact by 
including a dummy that would be equal to 1 at the time of the announcement and 0 otherwise. The third step then would be 
similar: compute the cross-sectional average economic impact of the event by aggregating the individual firm parameters and 
infer. Most of the studies that analyzed mega-events perform only the first two steps, i.e., they only evaluate the significance 
of the effects for a single market. ￿ ￿￿
 
4.2.1. Abnormal returns 
The  methodology  employed  to  measure  the  magnitude  of  stock  price  reactions  to 
announcements  is  the  standard  abnormal  returns  technique  based  upon  the  several 
benchmarks described below. We examine the impact of the nomination on returns as of the 
announcement date. We analyze several other windows to account for partial anticipation and 
leakages in information or delayed effects due to thin trading.  
 
Daily  abnormal  returns  were  calculated  using  constant-mean,  market-adjusted  and  risk-
adjusted methods described in Brown and Warner (1985).
24 The date of the announcement is 
designated as day t=0. Daily returns are collected for the period (t=-140 to 20). The estimation 
and event periods were defined respectively as [-140, -21] and [-20, 20]. 
 
Abnormal returns, ARit, are obtained as the difference between observed (log) returns of the 
country i at event day t, Rit, and the expected return generated by a chosen benchmark ￿(Rit). 
￿(Rit) is defined as follows, respectively for the constant-mean return, the market-adjusted 
and the risk-adjusted methods: 
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The presence of unequal integration of the countries analyzed makes it difficult to find a good 
model to the pricing of these securities. We assume that the degree of segmentation is fixed 
through the period of estimation of risk exposures and that markets are fully integrated with 
the world market.  We thus use an unconditional world market model. Parameters a and b 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
24 Kothari and Warner (2006) show that the tests are not highly sensitive to the benchmark model of abnormal returns. 
Market-adjusted returns are not included here for all tests. Results are available upon request.  ￿ ￿￿
were estimated regressing market index returns on the world market index over the estimation 
period. 
 
Averaging abnormal returns across markets in common event time, we obtain the average 
cross-sectional abnormal return given by: 
 





= ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  
where N is the number of countries in the sample.  
 
By cumulating the average residuals over a particular time interval (-20<t1<=0; 0=<t2<20), 
we obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) as follows:
25 
 









The  procedure  is  similar  when  we  analyze  the  effects for  a  particular  industry.  CAR  are 
computed  by  first  averaging  daily  abnormal  industry  returns  across  markets  and  then 
cumulating industry average abnormal returns over the days that comprise the event window 
under scrutiny.
26  To compute  industry returns we use  the 32  Datastream  industry-level  4 
index series. 
 
We  use  both  parametric  and  non-parametric  tests  to  assess  the  statistical  significance  of 
average abnormal returns. The use of several tests aims at ensuring the robustness of results 
when  the  usual  assumptions  of  independence  in  the  cross-section,  constant  variance  or 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
25 Because we use continuously compounded returns, buy and hold returns for a specific time-span are achieved by simply 
summing the log returns. If we assume that discrete returns are distributed as iid log normal variables, cumulative log returns 
are normal distributed. 
26 The benchmarks to compute industry market- and risk-adjusted abnormal returns was the country’s total return market 
index. ￿ ￿￿
normality of returns are incorrect.
27 The parametric test statistics examined are Brown and 
Warner  (1980,  1985)  with  and  without  crude  dependence  adjustment,  the  standardized 
residual test and Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) standardized cross-sectional test. 
The  non-parametric statistics are the  sign test, Corrado (1989)’s rank test and Wilcoxon-
signed rank test.
28 Please refer to Serra (2004) for details. 
 
 
4.2.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
To  estimate  the  impact  of  the  determinants  on  the  cross-sectional  variation  of  abnormal 




+ + + + + + = j 5 j 4 j 3 j 2 j 1 0 js EXP REC LIQ LAG SIZE CAR b b b b b b    
js k k k j 7 js 6 D VOT REP h g b b + + + + ￿      (7) 
where 
CARjs are the cumulative abnormal returns for industry s (in host country j); 
SIZEj is the ratio between the event capital expenditure and the host country j GDP; 
LAGj  is the time lag between the announcement and the moment of the event hosted 
by country j;  
LIQj  is the ratio between country j market capitalization and its GDP; 
RECj is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in recession at the time of the event 
hosted by country j and 0 otherwise; 
EXPj is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in expansion at the time of the event 
hosted by country j and 0 otherwise; 
REPjs is the ratio of industry s market capitalization and the overall capitalization of 
country j stock market; 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
27 Kothari and Warner (2006) show that with short horizons, the usual test statistic is not highly sensitive to assumptions 
about the cross-sectional or times-series dependence or normality of returns. Further, they show that short horizon event 
study tests are generally well-specified but the power of the tests is sensitive to sample size and firm characteristics (such as 
volatility). For firms with low volatility, sample size of 20 is enough attain full power for a 1% abnormal return. 
28 The tables below report the statistics for the usual Brown and Warner (1989, 1985) parametric tests and for the sign test. 
Other results are available upon request.  
29 We run the same regression for market CARs (instead of industry CARs) using OLS (instead of fixed effects) without the 
industry-specific variable REP. ￿ ￿￿
VOTj is the difference in the percentage of votes between winning country j and the 
losing country with the largest number of votes in the last round; 
Dk are dummies for each type of event (Olympic Games, etc.); and 
￿js is an i.i.d. error term. 
 
The variable SIZE is motivated by Burton et al. (1999) that report that the market impact of 
capital  expenditures  announcements  is  stronger  for  larger  projects.  Yet,  the  findings  of 
Woolridge  and  Snow  (1990)  do  not  confirm  this  relation.  Given  that  we  are  comparing 
countries with very different economy sizes we use relative instead of absolute size.
30 
 
The variable LAG proxies investors’ myopia. Burton et al. (1999) and Woolridge and Snow 
(1990) fail to find any significant different effect in market reaction between long-term and 
short-term project announcements. 
 
Our  main  variable  of  interest  is  VOT.  We  expect  that  the  smaller  the  difference  in  the 
percentage of votes between the two candidates in the last round, the larger the surprise in the 
announcement news and therefore the larger the impact on prices.  
 
We also control for a set of variables found important by previous studies. LIQ tries to capture 
how well the economic output of a particular country is mirrored in its stock market. REP is 
an industry-specific variable to control for the importance of a particular industry in the stock 
market. To accommodate the findings of McQueen and Roley (1993) that report a negative 
relation between market impact and economic activity, we also include the variables REC and 
EXP. These variables proxy economy-wide activity. We follow McQueen and Roley (1993) 
methodology to define economic states.
31 Finally, we include dummies for the type of event 
and allow for industry fixed effects to account for differential benefits across industries. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
30 Veraros et al. (2004) argue that the difference in the reaction of Athens and Milan stock exchanges could result from 
economy size differences (Greece and Italy) and the importance of the two cities potentially hosting the event (Athens and 
Rome) and, as such, a much stronger effect on the national economy of Greece. 
31 McQueen e Roley (1993): “We use the seasonally adjusted monthly industrial production index, to define economic states. 
First, we estimate a trend in log of industrial production by regressing the actual log of industrial production on a constant 
and a time trend. Then we add and subtract a constant from the trend, creating the upper and lower bounds … so that the log 
of industrial production is above the upper bound, denoted as “high” economic activity, 25 percent of the time. The log of 
industrial production is below the lower bound, indicating “low” economic activity, about 25 percent of the time as well. 
“Medium” economic activity is represented by the remaining observations between the bounds.” ￿ ￿￿
 
4.2.3. Partially Anticipated Effects 
We  analyze two specifications to evaluate the role of partial anticipation.  
 
Partial Anticipation I 
On the basis of the model derived in appendix B, we propose the following empirical testable 
model: 
 
) 8 ( D p CAR i i i i m d f a + + + =  
where  
CARi    are  the  cumulative  abnormal  returns  over  the  event  window  for  country  i 
aggregate market index; (i=winners, losers) 
pi is defined as the probability of country i hosting the event; 
Di is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country i is nominated and 0 otherwise; and 
mi is a i.i.d. error term. 
 
To estimate a, f and d we pool the cumulative abnormal returns of the winning and losing 
countries across events.  
 
If the country is chosen to host (or not host) the event, expected abnormal returns are given 
by, respectively: 
 
) 9 ( ˆ p ˆ ˆ   ) E(CAR
r  for Winne ted effect Unanticipa
j j
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
d f a + + =  
 
) 10 ( p ˆ ˆ   ) E(CAR
Loser for effect ted Unanticipa
l l
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
f a + =  
 
Given the expressions (A-4) and (A-5) in appendix 
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where Vj-1 and Vl-1 denote, respectively, the winning country j and the losing country l market 
valuation just before the event is announced; NPVj and NPVl stand for the economic impact of 
the event for each country.   
 
Rational arguments yield the following predictions: 
- a=0, f<0, d>0  
Assuming that the effects observed reflect solely the economic impact of the event (i.e., a=0), 
d and f will capture all the relevant effects. f reflects that stock prices will adjust downwards 
for the losing country in the unanticipated effect (that the country would lose). fpj+d  reflects 
the upwards adjustment in stock prices for the winning country in the unanticipated effect 
(that the country would win). If the economic impact of the event was similar for the two 
countries  (in  percentage  of  its  actual  market  capitalization),  d  would  capture  the  total 
economic impact of the project. Ceteris paribus, the greater the impact of the project (NPV), 
the larger the magnitude of the parameters, d and f. When the event is not anticipated at all, d 
captures the full economic impact for the winning country (E(CARj)=d and E(CARl)=0). 
 
If stock prices are influenced by sentiment, the above parameters must be reinterpreted. Given 
that the parameter d could now reflect the effect of positive sentiment, and assuming that in 
that setting parameter  f could be disregarded (f=0, prices would be affected by investor 
sentiment, regardless of the objective probability of observing the event), a would capture the 
negative  sentiment  in prices.  Further, if sentiment effects are  more  pronounced  when the ￿ ￿￿
country looses, then |a|>|d|. The testable predictions for the behavioral arguments are the 
following. 
- d>0 and a<0 (positive sentiment for winners and negative sentiment for losers); 
- |a|>|d| (asymmetric sentiment effects);  
Notice that if the a estimate is negative and significantly different from zero, one can 
disentangle rational and behavioral arguments. 
  
Partial Anticipation II 
To account for market expectations in (8), we use the percentage of votes received by the 
country in the last round. This may be considered an objective prior probability assuming 
rational expectations. Yet, the selection process is highly competitive and, in the successive 
rounds of voting, the ranking is often reversed, and front runners are many times overtaken by 
other  candidates.    One  could  argue  that  initial  and  intermediate  rankings  also  influence 
investors’ expectations. To account for that, we tested the following alternative specification: 
 
) 13 ( TS D PS D D TS PS i i i 2 i i 1 i 0 i 2 i 1 0 w l l l j j j + + + + + + = ￿ ￿￿￿  
where  
CARi and Di are defined as in (8); (i=winners, losers) 
PSi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are a partial 
surprise  and 0 otherwise;  
TSi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are an almost 
total surprise and 0 otherwise; and 
wi is an i.i.d. error term. 
 
The specification (13) accommodates the fact that investors form their expectations on the 
basis of all rounds of voting. Further we also take into account the country bidding record. 
The  motivation  for  including  this  piece  of  information  is  grounded  on  the  idea  that  the 
selection outcome is influenced by the lobbying power of the candidacies (Veraros, et al. 
(2004)): if the country did bid for hosting the last event and lost, investors may perceive that 
the lobbying power is limited and anticipate that, once again the candidacy will not succeed. 
 ￿ ￿￿
We classify the announcement news as total surprises, out of line to market expectations, 
when:  
- for the winning country, the country did not consistently lead the ranking in the 
previous voting rounds, and had bid for hosting the previous event; 
- for the losing country, the country lead the ranking in some of the previous voting 
rounds, and had not bid for hosting the previous event. 
 
Announcement news are classified as partial surprises when:  
- for the winning country, the country consistently lead the ranking in all the previous 
voting rounds, and had bid for hosting the previous event; or the country did not lead the 
ranking in all previous voting rounds but had not bid for hosting the previous event. 
- for the losing country, the country never lead the ranking in the successive voting 
rounds, but had not bid for hosting the previous event; or the country lead the ranking in only 
one of the previous voting rounds but had bid for hosting the previous event. 
 
Expected abnormal returns for the winning and losing bidders for the cases of total surprise 
and partial surprise can be summarized as follows: 
 
Surprise/Country  Winning  Loosing 
No Surprise  j0+l0  l0 
Partial Surprise  j0+j1+l0+l1  j0+j1 
Total Surprise  j0+j2+l0+l1  j0+j2 
 
Rational arguments yield the following predictions for the winning country: 
- j0+l0 = 0; j0+ j1+l0+l1 >0; j0+ j1+l0+l2 > 0; and  
j0+ j2+l0+l2 > j0+ j1+l0+l1. 
For the losing country, the predictions are: 
- j0 = 0; j0+j1 < 0; j 0+j2 < 0; and|j0+j2| > |j0+j1|. 
If there is no surprise, abnormal returns as of the announcement date should be null. The 
greater the surprise, the greater the positive (negative) impact of the nomination news for the 
winning (losing) country. 
 ￿ ￿￿
Behavioral arguments predict that: 
- j0+l0 > 0; j0 < 0; and - j0>l0/2 (asymmetrical effect). 
As in (8), if prices were affected by investor sentiment, regardless of the objective probability 
of observing the event, the behavioral effect would be subsumed by parameters j0 and l0. 
     
5. RESULTS 
 
In this section we present and discuss the observed valuation effects as of the date of the 
announcement of the country nomination to host a mega-event, as well as the findings in 
terms of what factors drive the observed results. Section 5.1 discusses the magnitude and 
significance of the observed abnormal returns at the announcement date. Section 5.2 presents 
the  results for  the  cross-sectional  analysis  and section  5.3.  presents  the  estimates  for  the 
proposed model specifications of partial anticipation. 
 
5.1. Abnormal returns 
 
The average abnormal returns are shown in tables 4, 5 and 6. Table A.2 in appendix shows the 
abnormal results for each individual host country. 
 
5.1.1 Winning Countries 
Aggregate Market Reaction 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The first hypothesis that we test is whether the announcement of a mega-event is associated 
with a positive stock market reaction on the nominated country. Table 4 shows the abnormal 
returns at and around the moment the nomination information was released, for each type of 
event. The table shows the abnormal returns controlling for worldwide market effects that we 
assume to be unaffected from that particular country specific event. We present market-model 




32 We looked upon other significance parametric and non parametric tests. Results are not reported here to save space. The 
significance of the results discussed in the paper is barely unchanged. ￿ ￿￿
 
We observe no significant stock market reaction at the announcement dates. This is true for 
all the events we analyze except for a positive reaction at the announcement of Specialized 
Exhibitions: the sign test  shows that 8  out the 10  countries in  sample showed a  positive 
abnormal return. Overall the magnitude of the observed market reaction is economically and 
statistically insignificant. 
 
The  magnitude  and  significance  of  the  CARs  for  the  other  windows  analyzed  is  not 
significantly  from  zero  with  two  exceptions:  market-model  CARs  register  a  positive 
significant effect for the Specialized Exhibitions over the window periods [0,1] and [0,5]; and 
there is a negative significant CAR [-1,1] for the European Capitals of Culture. In  both cases 
the results are barely significant and only if we use non-parametric tests. 
 
The evidence does not suggest a differential market reaction for sport or cultural events. The 
only statistically significant result we observe regards a cultural event but the relation could 
be spurious. 
 
Individual Markets Reaction 
As noted above, we expect that the impact varies across events and markets reflecting several 
factors such as the importance of the event relative to the underlying economy or the degree 
of  partial  anticipation. The  results  in  table  4 could  thus  reflect  that  there is considerable 
variation across individual markets. Table A.2 in appendix shows the stock market abnormal 
returns for each nominated country. We concentrate here on the effects at the announcement 
date [0,0]. We observe that some markets experience positive returns while others experience 
negative returns but in most cases these are not statistically significant.  
 
We observe significant positive abnormal returns for:  
￿  Greece  (+7.8%),  regarding  the  announcement  of  the  nomination  to  host  the  2004 
Olympic Games; this result is consistent with Veraros et al. (2004) They find that ￿ ￿￿
upon the announcement of the nomination, there was a positive and significant effect 
on the Athens Stock Exchange general index;
33 
￿  Sweden (+1.5%) regarding the 1992 European Football Cup; 
￿  China (+1.9%, marginally significant at 10%) regarding the 2010 World Exhibition; 
￿  Belgian (+0.95%) regarding the 2000 European Capital of Culture. 
As for the significant negative abnormal returns, these are: 
￿  the US (-2.6%) regarding the 1980 Winter Olympic Games; 
￿  Italy (-1.7%) regarding the 1990 World Football Cup; 
￿  Germany (-1.1%)  regarding the 1988 European Football Cup; 
￿  Netherlands (-1.3%) regarding the 2000 European Football Cup; 
￿  Spain  (-1.6%) regarding the 1992 World Exhibition; 
￿  Sweden (-2.5%), Germany (-2.0%), Czech Republic (-1.4%) respectively, regarding 
the European Capitals of Culture of 1998, 1999 and 2000. 




Thus,  regarding  our  first  hypothesis,  we  cannot  reject  the  null  of  no  significant  average 
aggregate  market  reaction  to  the  announcements  of  hosting  country  nominations.  The 
individual market analysis suggests that some markets react positively to the announcement of 
mega-events while others react negatively. Yet, overall, the effect is trivial and, on average, 
not  significantly  different  from  zero.    The  results  are  similar  across  the  different  event 
categories.  The  findings  seem  to  be  fairly  robust:  abnormal  performance  remains 
economically and statistically insignificant at and around the announcement date regardless of 
the model we use to compute abnormal returns or the chosen parametric or non parametric 
test we use to assess significance. A non-significant average impact is consistent with rational 
expectations. Yet the results of the individual market analysis show that the impact is varying 
and, for some markets (or events), the effects are positive and statistically significant and this 




33 Yet the authors document that there were no significant effects on the general index for the losing country (Italy). 
34  Alternatively  one  could  argue  that  the  market  perceives  these  (in  most  cases  public)  investments  as  economy-wide 
damaging projects. The reasons for pursuing these mega-projects would have to be mostly  political. ￿ ￿￿
Individual Industries Reaction 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
We now examine hypothesis (iii). We evaluate the price impact of the announcement at an 
industry-level. We compute industry CARs for 32 individual industries. For each industry we 
compute the cumulative cross-market average abnormal return. Our primary interest is to 
examine whether those industries that were a priori identified as directly gaining from the 
organization of the event, did observe more positive significant abnormal returns. Table 5 
shows the announcement date ARs and the announcement date to next-day CARs for seven 
industries: Beverages, Construction, Leisure and Tourism, Media, Retail, Communications 
and Transportation.
35 The last row of each panel shows the grand mean (across all industries). 
Panels A to G contain the results for each event category. 
 
Let’s start with the grand mean abnormal return. Overall the results are similar to those in 
table 4: the effect is economically and statistically insignificant.
36 As highlighted above, there 
seems to be a positive effect associated with the announcements of Specialized Exhibitions 
(+0.5%).  Additionally,  the  Winter  Olympic  Games  show  now  a  negative  effect  (-1.0%). 
These results are statistically significant for the constant-mean residuals. 
 
When we examine the individual industry abnormal returns, we fail to find consistent positive 
returns for the selected industries and, in most cases, the effects are small and not statistically 
different from zero. We observe (marginally) positive effects for the following industries: 
￿  Communications (+0.7%) regarding the World Exhibitions; 
￿  Retail (+0.9%) regarding the World Football Cups; 
￿  Construction (+1.2%) regarding the Summer Olympic Games; 
￿  Media (0.6%) for the European Capitals of Culture.  
Yet we also find significant negative effects for a couple of industries. These are: 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
35 Results for the other industries are not reported here to save space. 
36 The aggregate values shown at the bottom of table 5 are equally-weighted averages of industry indices. The comparison of 
these equally-weighted values with the value-weighted averages reported in table 4, show that market weights do not drive 
the results. ￿ ￿￿
￿  Media (-1.7%) regarding the Winter Olympic Games;  
￿  Transportation (-2.1%) regarding the European Football Cups. 
These results are inconsistent with value-maximization theories because we fail to observe a 
positive significant effect for industries that a priori would benefit from the event. In any case, 
as above, results could reflect that these effects have already been anticipated by investors. 
 
The results discussed in this and in the previous sections are not consistent with sentiment 
arguments because we do not observe a general positive effect that would reflect the joy 
associated with the nomination. Yet it can be argued that the sentiment effect will be more 
strongly reflected if the country is not nominated. Prices would reflect misery not joy. The 
next section examines the market impact felt by the losing countries. 
 
5.1.2 Losing Countries 
 
 [TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
We now shift to the impact of the announcement on the losing countries stock market prices. 
Hypothesis (ii) was that the announcement of the nomination would affect negatively the 
losing  country  stock  market.  This  result  would  indicate  that,  prior  to  the  announcement, 
market  expectations  included  the  likelihood  country  could  win  and  benefit  from  the 
organization of the event. When the country loses, prices adjust downwards. Alternatively, a 
negative reaction could be merely associated with sentimental failure.  
 
Table 6 shows the aggregate stock market effects for losers. Our sub-sample includes only 
those countries for which there was information regarding the losing candidates. Because of 
that, we had to exclude some of the World and all the European Football Cups. We also 
excluded the Specialized Exhibitions and the European Capitals of Culture  because these 
were  single  candidacies-events.  Further  we  excluded  some  losers  for  which  market  price 
information was not available. The final sub-sample comprises thus fifteen announcements (5 
Olympic Summer Games, 5 Olympic Winter Games, 1 World Football Cup and 4 World 
Exhibitions. We do not find a statistical significant negative market reaction as the partial 
anticipation or sentiment arguments would predict. On the contrary, for the specific case of ￿ ￿￿
the  World  Exhibitions  we  even  observe  a  couple  of  positive  CARs.  Overall  results  are 
consistent with perfect anticipation. 
 
 
5.1.3. Summary of Abnormal Performance 
The bulk of the evidence so far is consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis or full 
anticipation.  As  observed  above,  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  admits  that  such 
announcements will not affect the market value of listed firms because investors perceive 
these  news imply  no change in their investment opportunities. The announcements could 
simply name these growth opportunities. The results of the individual market analysis show a 
wide  variation  in  the  price  impact  observed.  Below,  we  investigate  whether  between  the 
variation in impact (across markets and events) is systematically related to factors such as 
economy-wide differential benefits or partial anticipation. 
 
5.2.  Cross-sectional analysis 
 
5.2.1.  Variables  
We evaluate the relation between the observed abnormal performance and a set of event, 
market and industry attributes as proposed by the empirical specification in (7). Abnormal 
returns  are  constant-mean  adjusted  returns.  Table  A.3  in  appendix  presents  descriptive 
information for the variables of interest included in the cross-sectional analysis. The data 
shown  are  the  mean,  median,  minimum,  maximum  and  standard  deviation  of  some 
characteristics  of  the  events  (relative  size,  lag  and  differential  in  votes  received  by  the 
winning country in excess of the other final candidate), in aggregate and for each category or 
type  of  event.  The  table  refers  to  a  subset  (32)  of  the  events  analyzed  above  for  which 
information was available. These are 6 Summer Olympic Games, 8 Winter Olympic Games, 1 
World Football Cup, 10 World Exhibitions and 7 Specialized Exhibitions. 
 
The average mega-event has an investment of around 1% of the country GNP, is announced 6 
years in advance, and gets 56% votes more than the losing country in the last round of voting.  
 ￿ ￿￿
On average, mega-events involve an investment of 1.24% of the host country GDP. Yet the 
median  event  is  much  smaller,  of  a  magnitude  of  0.17%  of  the  host  country  GDP.  The 
standard deviation is 1.74% and ranges from 0.002% (the 1980 Specialized Exhibition in 
Canada) to a maximum of 10.56% (the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Spain). When we 
split  the  sample  into  groups  according  to  the  type  of  event,  we  observe  that  the  most 
important type of event are the Summer Olympic Games, that show an average (median) 
relative  size  of  3.3%  (1.7%),  followed  by  the  Olympic  Winter  Games  and  the  World 
Exhibitions that register the same average of 1.1%. Specialized Exhibitions show the lowest 
percentages  with an average  of less than 0.1%. On aggregate, and for any  type  of  event 
analyzed,  there  seems  to  be  no  positive  or  negative  deterministic  trend  over  time  in  the 
relative amounts invested (even if increasing in absolute terms).
37 
 
The  average  (median)  event  is  held  69  (71)  months  after  its  announcement  and  ranges 
between 1 (again the 1980 Specialized Exhibition in Canada) and 10 years (and again the 
1992  Summer  Olympic  Games  in  Spain).
38  Specialized  Exhibitions  take  on  average  49 
months to be completed, against an average of 78, 69 and 76 months respectively for the 
Summer Olympic Games, the Winter Olympic Games and the World Exhibitions. The results 
suggest a positive relation between the size of the event and the time it takes to develop (and 
therefore the need to be announced in advance): this is the case for the 1992 Summer Olympic 
Games in Spain, whose investment amounted to 10.56% of GNP and was announced 10 years 
in advance. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is positive (18.6%) but not 
statistically significant. 
 
The average (median) percent of votes received by the winning country in excess of the other 
final candidate just before the outcome of the bidding process is revealed is 56% (39%). This 
result suggests that the outcome of these biddings is largely anticipated. In fact, this is the 
case for the Specialized Exhibitions for which, in all cases, there was only a single candidacy. 
As for the World Exhibitions, only the four more recent ones were competitive biddings. This 
is not the case for other events for which the bidding process is rather competitive like the 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
37 “Beijing' s Olympics-related spending of around $35 billion, they calculated, would make up more than 43% of the total for 
all the games, including Beijing' s, since Montreal' s in 1976”, The Economist, March 1, 2007. 
38 World Football Cups are announced 6 years in advance while European Football Cups were traditionally announced 4 
years in advance but, in the more recent years, the announcement has been made earlier (about 5 years in advance).   ￿ ￿￿
Olympic Games and the Football Cups. The information regarding the voting rounds is only 
publicly available for the Olympic Games, the World Exhibitions and, very recently, also for 
the  World  Football  Cups.  The  Olympic  Games  seem  to  be  the  most  highly  competitive 
biddings: the average (median) difference in votes between the winning and losing countries 
in the last round is respectively 28.8% and 32.7% (20.3% and 27.5%) for the Winter and 
Summer Games with a minimum of 2.3% (2000 Summer Olympic Games in Australia). The 
average (median) difference in votes for the 5 World Football Cups, for which voting results 
have been made publicly available, is 34.7% (26.3%) with a minimum of 4.3% for the 2006 
Cup in Germany.




To save space we do not report here the statistics for the control variables used in the analysis. 
These include, at the market-level, the variable LIQ that proxies for differences in the role of 
the stock market across countries, and the indicator variables for economic activity, REC and 
EXP; at the industry-level, the variable REP is meant to capture the importance of a particular 
industry in total market capitalization. On average, stock markets represent 34% of GNP. Out 
of  the  total  announcements  only  9.4%  occurred  in  recessions,  while  37.5%  occurred  in 
expansions. This asymmetry is surprising given that in most cases, as we have seen above, the 
announcements of the nominations occur regularly to allow enough time for the organization 
of the event and, in some instances, for the development of the required infrastructures to host 
the event. It is thus very unlikely that the selection committee times the announcement, and 
the result must be either spurious or reflecting above-average economic performance over the 
sample period. Finally the average (median) value for REP is 3.8% (1.9%) ranging from near 
zero to 49%. 
 
5.2.2.  GLS estimates  
We regress cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,1]) against the set of variables described in 
the previous section. Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients of the industry fixed effects 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
39 This was a very tight victory: Germany secured 12 out of the 23 votes against the 12 received by South Africa (the other 
candidate in the final round).  
40 The minimum was 2.4% for the 2000 World Exhibition: Germany secured 21 out the 41 votes against the 20 received by 
Canada. ￿ ￿￿
regressions for two specifications (with and without the variable REP). We use a total of 
699/701 pooled industry observations regarding 32 events. 
 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
The regressions show an adjusted R-square of 19% and estimates are similar for the two 
specifications.    We  find  statistically  significant  coefficients  for  the  independent  variables 
LAG, VOT and REP as well as for the two dummies D_WSG and D_WE. As for the variable 
LAG, the coefficient is economically and statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent 
with the investors’ myopia hypothesis, the reaction to the announcement is smaller the larger 
the lag between the announcement and the realization of the event. For each further month, 
the CAR declines by 0.01%. The coefficient associated with the variable VOT is also very 
significant (at 1% level) and is consistent with investors partially anticipating the outcome of 
the bidding process. The more competitive the voting process (i.e., the smaller the difference 
in votes between the winning and the losing candidates), the larger the surprise and the greater 
the market impact. For a decline of 10% in the difference between the percentage of votes for 
winning and losing bidders, the CAR increases 0.23%. The coefficient of the control variable 
REP is significant at a 5% level. This positive relation between industry market weight and 
price impact could reflect awareness. If the industry is well-represented, investors will be 
more inclined to believe that mega-event news will affect the companies belonging to that 
industry. 
 
The results for the OLS regressions using market (instead of industry) CARs are weak. The 
signs of the parameters are the same but the estimates lack statistical significance. This could 
directly stem from small sample size (32 events, 23 degrees of freedom). 
 
5.2.3. Summary 
The  estimates of  the cross-sectional regressions  results confirm  that abnormal returns are 
lower  when  the  outcome  is  predictable  and  the  larger  the  time-span  between  the 
announcement and the realization of the event. No general statement can be made regarding 
the economic merit of hosting mega-events but the evidence suggests that investors react as if ￿ ￿￿
some  countries  benefit  from  the  organization  of  some  mega-events  such  as  the  World 
Exhibitions. 
 
5.3. Partial anticipation 
 
5.3.1 Partial anticipation I 
To evaluate the role of partial anticipation we test the model specification in (8). We pool the 
CARs for winners and losers. Our sample comprises 39 observations (24 winners and 15 
losers).  
 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
Panel A of Table 8 gives the results. The parameter associated with the prior probability of 
winning is negative (but not statistically significant). As for the parameter associated with the 
dummy for the nomination, we observed a positive and statistically significant estimate. The 
fit of the regression is poor but the evidence suggests that the effects are consistent with the 
rational predictions of the model proposed in Appendix B:  
￿  losers register, on average, negative price impacts and the magnitude of the effect  is 
associated with their priors of winning, and  
￿  winners register, on average, positive price impacts; the magnitude of the effect is 
positively  (negatively)  related  with  the  degree  of  surprise  (anticipation)  in  the 
nomination news. 
The evidence is not consistent with behavioral arguments. The sign of the intercept estimate is 
against the prediction (positive instead of negative) and not statistically different from zero. 
  
We also run the regression with a balanced sample, including only those events for which we 
had information regarding the winning and for the losing bidders., i.e., we only (14 events, 28 
observations -14 winners and 14 losers). The results are inconclusive.  
 
5.3.2 Partial anticipation II ￿ ￿￿
We  now  turn  to  the  alternative  specification  model  of  partial  anticipation  in  (13).  This 
specification  uses  a  more  refined  proxy  of  the  degree  of  surprise  (anticipation)  in  the 
announcement news, using the information in all the successive rounds of voting. 
 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
The regression results are shown in table 9.  As for the previous model we estimate the model 
with unbalanced and balanced samples (panels A and B, respectively). To evaluate the effects 
for the winning  and losing countries we perform a series  of linear  tests of  the  estimated 
parameters.  
 
The fit of the model is good and similar for the unbalanced and balanced samples (adjusted R-
square of 46% and 60%, respectively). We comment upon Panel A given that both panels 
show  very  similar  results.  Overall  the  estimated  parameters  are  in  line  with  the  rational 
predictions. We observe that: 
￿  (1) when the outcome of the bidding process contains little or no news (in other words, 
there  is  partial  or  no  surprise)  there  is  no  significant  market  reaction  for  the  losers: 
Intercept+PS (-0.32%) and Intercept (0.54%) are not statistically significant. For the winning 
countries, the effect is negative (Intercept+D=-0.68%) and significant at the 10% level, if no 
surprise,  and  negative  but  not  statistically  significant  if  partial  surprise 
(Intercept+PS+D+D*PS=-0.89%).  
￿  (2) when the outcome of the bidding process is a total surprise, the market reaction is 
negative  and  statistically  significant for  losers (Intercept+TS=-3.31%). For  the  nominated 
countries we observe a very significant positive reaction (Intercept+TS+D*TS=+4.96%) We 
reject the null that the effects are the same for partial or total surprises.  
￿ (3) the results in (1) and (2) are generally inconsistent with sentiment arguments; further 
when we test for an asymmetric effect, we observe that, even when we control for partial 
anticipation, there are no stronger negative effects for losers.  
 
5.3.3. Summary 
The  results  of  the  partial  anticipation  models  show  that,  when  we  control  for  prior 
expectations, the announcement of mega-events is associated with a positive market reaction ￿ ￿￿
in  the  nominated  country  and  a  negative  reaction  in  the  losing  country.  The  greater  the 





This paper investigates the impact of international sporting and cultural events on national 
stock markets. We study market reaction to the announcement of the selected country hosting 
the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the European Football Cup 
and World and Specialized Exhibitions. Using a cross-section of 81 events, we find that the 
abnormal returns measured at the announcement date are not consistently different from zero. 
When we look at particular industries, we find no evidence supporting that industries, that a 
priori were more likely to extract direct benefits from the event, observe stronger effects. We 
also find insignificant CARs for losing bidders. Given that for most of the events we study, 
the  outcome  is  partially  anticipated  by  investors,  the  market  reaction  around  the 
announcement date does not seem to accurately measure the perceived economic impact  of 
these events. In fact, when we control for the prior expectations upon the outcome of the 
voting, the announcement of mega-events is associated with a positive market reaction in the 
nominated country and a negative reaction in the losing country. Our main results seem to 
hold for different definitions of abnormal performance and using a battery of tests to assess 
statistical  significance  and  alternative  empirical  specifications  to  control  for  anticipation. 
Overall  we  interpret  our  findings  as  supportive  of  rational  asset  pricing  and  partial 
anticipation: when the announcement news are total surprises, market reaction is significant, 
positive for winners and negative for losers, reflecting that investors evaluate these mega-
events announcements as positive news.  
 
The market reaction we observe seems to reflect only a part of the overall perceived economic 
benefit of these mega-events. It is thus not correct to extrapolate these results to judge the 
economic  merit  of  hosting  these  mega-events.  The  evidence  suggests  further  that  the 
economic benefits of hosting these mega-events vary across markets and events. The main 
finding of our study is that part of the variation in market reaction is associated with the 
degree of anticipation of the outcome of the bidding process. Further work is required to 
establish the other determinants of the observed cross-sectional variation in market reaction. ￿ ￿￿
Appendix A. Typology of Events 
I. THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
www.olympic.org 
The Olympic Games is an international multi-sport event comprised of summer and winter events. 
Since 1994, each season' s games have been held every four years, two years apart. The most recent 
Summer Olympics were the 2004 Games in Athens, Greece  and the most recent Winter Olympics 
were the 2006 Games in Turin, Italy. 
 
The  host  selection  process  is  a  highly  competitive  procedure.  The  process  consists  of  successive 
rounds of voting. In every round candidates with the least votes are left behind. If no candidate secures 
votes in excess of 50%, there are repetitive rounds until two candidates remain. In the last round of 
two, the country with more votes win. 
 
II. WORLD FOOTBALL CUPS 
www.fifa.com 
The World Cup is organized by FIFA- Fedération Internationale de Football Association. The World 
Cup is held every four years. Nations all over the world compete in regional qualifying matches for the 
32 places in the final tournament. Places are awarded to each region based on the number and quality 
of national teams in the area (ex: ELO ratings). Up to 1994, the finals were played in Europe and Latin 
America. Of the last 4 tournaments 2 were organized outside its traditional regions, in particular, in the 
US and in Japan/Korea. The last World Football Cup was held in Germany in 2006. 
 
The decision on the country organizer is made upon several rounds of voting by members (regional 
football confederations) of the venue selection committee. The  voting procedure is the following: 
voting will take place in successive rounds until one candidate receives a majority of those voting. If 
no candidate city achieves a majority in the first round, the candidate with the fewest votes drops out 
of the running, and the members vote again on the remaining candidates.  
 
III. EUROPEAN FOOTBALL CUPS 
www.uefa.com 
European Football Cups are held every 4 years. The first European Nations’ Cup, now known as the 
UEFA European Championship, was held in 1958. The bid process for staging UEFA EURO has been 
changing  over  time. In  recent  years  the  process  involves  an    initial pre-selection of the  potential ￿ ￿￿
bidders followed by the submission of initial bid dossiers by candidates. The final decision on the host 
of UEFA EURO is taken by UEFA Executive Committee. The last European Football Cup was held in 
Portugal in 2004. 
 
IV. WORLD EXHIBITIONS AND SPECIALIZED EXHIBITIONS 
www.bie-paris.org 
World (Universal or International) Exhibitions are held every five years. From having been exhibitions 
of state-of-the-art technological achievement, they are now broad national manifestations where the 
participating  countries  present  themselves  in  their  entirety.  The  rules  are  set  by  the  Bureau 
International  of  World  Exposition  (BIE).  Potential  host  nations  apply  to  the  BIE  to  hold  a  BIE-
sanctioned Expo to celebrate some special event or to represent a concept or theme of their choosing. 
Under  the  more  recent  protocol  (1988)  there  are  two  types  of  exposition  –  “registered”  and 
“recognized”.  The  registered  expos  are to be  held  every  5  years  starting  in  2010 In between  the 
“registered expos”, there will be one “recognized” exposition. The last World Exhibition was held in 
Aichi (Japan) in 2005. 
 
Specialized expositions are also supervised by BIE but unlike World expositions, there was no set time 
between specialized expositions. The last Specialized Exhibition was held in Rostock (Germany) in 
2003. 
 
V. EUROPEAN CAPITALS OF CULTURE 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/other_actions/cap_europ/cap_eu_en.html 
The European City of Culture project was launched in 1985. The European Cities of Culture have 
been chosen until 2004, on an intergovernmental basis. Since then, the European Capitals of Culture 
are designated each year by the Council of Ministers of the EU, on the basis of the view of a selection 
panel
41. In 2006, Patras (Greece) was the selected city. 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
41 The selection procedure is laid down in Decision 1419/1999/CE amended by Decision 649/2005/CE. This Decision sets 
out a chronological list of Member States entitling them to host the event in turn. It defines as well the criteria the cities have 
to comply with to be designated as European Capital of Culture. Each Member State is invited to submit its application for 
one or more cities at least four years in advance. ￿ ￿￿
Appendix B. A model of market impact of partially anticipated events 
This  appendix  presents  a  simple  model  of  partial  anticipation  that  generates  a  set  of 
hypotheses tested in our study.  The model we propose is built upon the models proposed by 
Malatesta and Thompson (1985) and Edmans, García and Norli (2007). 
 
As  in  Malatesta  and  Thomson  (1985),  we  consider  that  investors  partially  anticipate  the 
likelihood that  a  particular  country  hosts  one  or  several  international  sporting  or  cultural 
events. Let’s denote pi as the probability of country i hosting the event. Before the nominated 
host country is announced, the anticipated economic impact of the event is already reflected in 
the market valuations of the bidding countries. The economic impact of a particular event (its 
net present value) for candidate country listed firms is denoted by NPV.
42  If country j is 
chosen to host the contest, the (positive) market price effect at the date of announcement is 
given by (1-pj) x NPVj. The observed market impact is thus a biased estimate of the true 
economic effect and is inversely related to the prior probability of winning. As for the market 
impact of the candidate countries whose bids were rejected, the loser countries, we should 
observe  a  negative  market  effect  following  the  announcement,  and,  in  absolute  terms, 
positively related with the prior probability of winning. If we focus on the two countries in the 
last round of the voting process, when the final outcome is announced, the market price effect 
for the losing country l is given by –pl NPVl  that equals -(1-pj)NPVl. The potential benefits 
brought by the organization event are likely to be different from country to country (NPV 
varies  across  bidding  candidates)  and  consequently  the  absolute  magnitude  of  the  stock 
market effects to winners and losers can differ substantially. As such, a priori, asymmetric 
effects are expected for the winning and losing countries. 
 
In  assessing  the  probability  of  winning  (loosing),  investors  may  consider  the  degree  of 
competitiveness of the contest, whether the country is considered to be a front runner in 
advance and the initial rounds of the voting (that are publicized before the final outcome is 
realized). Our empirical model in section 4 accommodates some of these features. 
 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
42 Any interaction between the implementation of this project and the likelihood of future projects is ignored. For example, if 
a particular country is not nominated,, the probability of being chosen to host the same or similar events in the future may 
decrease – for example, European countries host the European Cities of Culture in turn - or increase – a country may be 
chosen to host the World Football Cup after successfully organizing an European Football Cup. ￿ ￿￿
At the day of the announcement, two possible outcomes may result. Either the country wins 
the  organization  of  the  event  or  looses.    Let’s  denote  VW  as  the  market  valuation  of  a 
particular  country at time 0 if it hosts the event and VL its market valuation otherwise. 
Market valuation just before the event is announced (t=-1) for a candidate country is thus 
given by: 
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
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(A1) can be rewritten as: 











Abnormal returns at the date of the announcement can be computed as: 
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and E(Ri) is the company’s expected return for a given return generating process. 
For the winning country j,    VW V j 0j = , and abnormal returns are thus given by:  
[ ]
  1 -









) ) E(R (1 VL   ) p - (1 VW p
VW
 







j j  j j
j
j


























NPV   ) p - (1 NPV p VL




j j j j j
j
)) E(R (1 V
NPV   ) p - (1




















that can be rewritten as 
5) - (A
  )) E(R (1 V
NPV   p -
1 -   
)) E(R (1 V
NPV p
  - 1
1
NPV p VL
NPV p - NPV p VL
l 1 - l
l l
l 1 - l
l l
l l l
l l l l l
)) E(R (1 V
NPV   ) p - (1 -















Acharya, S., 1993, “Value of latent information: Alternative event study methods”, Journal of 
Finance, 48: 363-385. 
 
Akhigbe, A., J. Madura and A.M. Whyte, 2004, “Partial anticipation and the gains to bank 
mergers”, Journal of Financial Services Research, 26: 55-71. 
 
Baade, R.A. and V.A. Matheson, 2004, “The quest for the cup: assessing the economic impact 
of the World Cup”, Regional Studies, 38.4: 343-354. 
 
Blose,  L.E.  and  J.C.P.  Shieh,  1997,  “Tobin’s  Q-ratio  and  market  reaction  to  capital 
investment announcements”, Financial Review, 32: 449-476. 
 
Boehmer,  E.,  J.  Musumeci,  and  A.  Poulsen,  A.,  1991,  “Event  study  methodology  under 
conditions of events induced variance”, Journal of Financial Economics, 30: 253-272. 
 
Brown,  S.,  and  J.  Warner,  1980,  “Measuring  security  price  performance”,  Journal  of 
Financial Economics, 8: 205-258. 
 
Brown, S. and J. Warner, 1985, “Using daily stock returns: the case of event studies”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 14: 3-31. 
 
Burton,  B.,  A.  Lonie  and  D.  Power,  1999,  “The  stock  market  reaction  to  investment 
announcement:  The  case  of  individual  capital  expenditure  projects”,  Journal  of  Business 
Finance & Accounting, 26: 681-708. 
 
Corrado, C.J., 1989, “A non-parametric test for abnormal security price performance in event 
studies”, Journal of Financial Economics, 23: 385-395. 
 
Dimson,  E.  and  M.  Mussavian,  1998,  “Professional  forum:  A  brief  history  of  market 
efficiency”, European Financial Management , 4: 91-103. 
 
Dwyer, L., P. Forsyth and R. Spurr, 2005, “Estimating the impacts of special events on an 
economy”, Journal of Travel Research, 43: 351-359. 
 
Edmans, A., D. García and Ø. Norli, 2007, “Sports sentiments and stock returns”, Journal of 
Finance, forthcoming. 
 
Fama, E., 1965. “Random walks in stock market prices”, Financial Analysts Journal, 55-59. 
 
Fama, E., 1991, “Efficient capital markets: II”, Journal of Finance,  46: 1575-1617. 
 
Fama, E., 1998, “Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioural finance”, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 49: 283-306. 
 
Kothari, S.P. and J.B. Warner., 2005, “Econometrics of event studies” in Eckbo, B. Espen 
(ed.), Handbook of Corporate Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Handbooks in Finance 
Series, Elsevier/North-Holland. 
 ￿ ￿￿
Jones, E., J. Danbolt and I. Hirst, 2004, “Company investment announcements and the market 
value of the firm”, European Journal of Finance, 10: 437-452(16) 
 
Malatesta, P.H. and Thompson, R., 1985, “Partially anticipated events: A model of stock price 
reactions with an application to corporate acquisitions”, Journal of Financial Economics, 14: 
237-250. 
 
Merton,  R.,  1987,  “A  simple  model  of  capital  market  equilibrium  with  incomplete 
information”, Journal of Finance, 42: 483-510. 
 
Miller, M. and F. Modigliani, 1958, “The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory 
of investment”, The American Economic Review, 48: 261-297. 
 
Preto, M., 2004, “UEFA Euro 2004 championship: Impact on Portuguese equities”, European 
Equity Research Reports, January. 
 
Serra, A., 2004, “Event study tests: A brief survey”, Gestão.Org, 2. 
 
Siegried,  J.  and  A.  Zimbalist,  2000,  “The  economics  of  sports  facilities  and  their 
communities”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14: 95-114. 
 
Titman, S., K.C.J. Wei, and F. Xie, 2004, Capital investments and stock returns, Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39: 677-700. 
 
Veraros, N., E. Kasimati and P. Dawson, 2004, “The 2004 Olympic Games announcement 
and its effect on the Athens and Milan stock exchanges”, Applied Economics Letters, 11: 749-
753. 
  
Vogt,  S.C.,  1997,  “Cash  flow  and  capital  spending:  evidence  from  capital  expenditures 
announcement”, Financial Management, 26: 44-57. 
 
Woolridge, J. and C. Snow, 1990, “Stock market reaction to strategic investment decisions”, 
Strategic Management Journal, 11: 353-363. ￿ ￿￿￿
Table 1   
Events analyzed: hosting country and type of event  
(number of events organized in parentheses) 
Hosting Country 








Cups  World Exhibitions  World Specialized Exhibitions  European Capitals of Culture 
(81)  (6)  (8)  (6)    (10)  (11)  (10)  (30) 
EUROPE (58) 
Germany (8)      2006  1988  2000  1983 / 1993 / 2003  1988 / 1999 
Austria (2)        2008      2003 
Belgian (3)        2000      2000 / 2002 
Denmark (1)              1996 
Spain (5)  1992        1992    1992 / 2000 / 2002 
Finland (1)              2000 
France (7)    1992  1998  1984      1989 / 1993 / 2000 / 2004 
Greece (3)  2004            1997 / 2006 
Netherlands (5)        2000    1982 / 2002  1987 / 2001 
Ireland (2)              1991 / 2005 
Italy (7)    2006  1990  1980    1992  1986 / 2000 / 2004 
Norway (2)    1994          2000 
Poland (1)              2000 
Portugal (3)        2004  1998    2001 
United Kingdom (4)        1996    1984  1990 / 2008 
Czech Republic (1)              2000 
Sweden (2)        1992      1998 
Switzerland (1)        2008       
NORTH AMERICA (11) 
Canada (4)    1988 / 2010      1986  1980   
USA (7)  1984 / 1996  1980 / 2002  1994    1982 / 1984     
ASIA (10) 
Japan (5)    1998  2002    1985 / 2005  1990   
South Korea (2)      2002    1993     
China (3)  2008        2010  1999   
OCEANY (2) 
Australia (2)  2000          1988   ￿ ￿￿￿
Table 2   
Events analyzed: losing candidacies  
(number of bids in parentheses) 
Losing Country/ Type of 
Event  Summer Olympic Games  Winter Olympic Games  World Football Cup  World Exhibitions 
  (13)  (13)  ( 2)   (6) 
EUROPE (19) 
Germany (1)  2000       
Austria (1)    2010     
France (2)  1992 / 2008       
Greece (N=1)  1996       
Italy (2)  2004  1988     
Norway (1)    1992     
United Kingdom (2)  2000    2006   
Russia (1)        2010 
Sweden (5)  2004  1992 / 1994 / 1998 / 2002     
Switzerland (2)    2002 / 2006     
Turkey (1)  2008       
NORTH AMERICA (9) 
Canada (6)  1996 / 2008  2002    1998 / 2000 / 2005 
USA (2)    1994 / 1998     
Mexico (1)        2010 
ASIA (3) 
Japan (1)  1988       
South Korea (2)    2010    2010 
AFRICA (2) 
South Africa (2)  2004    2006   
OCEANY (1) 
Australia (1)  1996       
 ￿ ￿￿￿
Table 3   
Events analyzed: voting results for the winning and losing countries over the several rounds 
 
PANEL A. Winning Countries 
Ranking 
Event  Host 
Country 
1
st Round  2
nd Round  3
rd Round  4
th Round  5
th Round  Always 
Leading? 
Bid in  
previous 
event? 
Summer Olympic Games         
1984  USA  single candidacy  Yes  No 
1992  Spain  first  first  first      Yes  No 
1996  USA  second  third  first  first  first  No  No 
2000  Australia  second  second  second  first    No  Yes 
2004  Greece  second  first  first  first    No  Yes 
2008  China  first  first        Yes  No 
Winter Olympic Games                 
1980  USA  single candidacy  Yes  No 
1988  Canada  first  first        Yes  No 
1992  France  second  first  first  first  first  Yes  No 
1994  Norway  first  second  first      No  Yes 
1998  Japan  first  first  first  first    No  No 
2002  USA  first          Yes  Yes 
2006  Italy  first          Yes  No 
2010  Canada  second  first        Yes  No 
World Exhibitions                 
1998  Portugal  first          Yes  No 
2000  Germany  first          Yes  No 
2005  Japan  first          Yes  No 
2010  China  first  first  first  first    Yes  No 
World Football Cups                 
1990  Italy  first          Yes  No 
1994  USA  first          Yes  No 
1998  France  first          Yes  No 
1998  Japan  single candidacy  Yes  No 
  Korea  single candidacy  Yes  No 
2006  Germany  first  second  first      No  No ￿ ￿￿￿
 
Table 3  (ctd.) 
Events analyzed: voting results for the winning and losing countries over the several rounds 
 
PANEL B. Losing Countries 
Ranking 
Event  Losing 
Country 
1
st Round  2
nd Round  3
rd Round  4
th Round  5
th Round  Ever 
Leading? 
Bid in  
previous event? 
Summer Olympic Games                 
1988  Japan  second          no  no 
1992  France  first  second  second      no  no 
1996  Greece  first  first  First  second  second  yes  no 
2004  Italy  second  second  second  second    no  no 
2008  Canada  second  second        no  no 
Winter Olympic Games                 
1994  Sweden  third  first  second      yes  yes 
1998  USA  fourth  second  second  second    yes  no 
2002  Switzerland  second          no  no 
2006  Switzerland  second          no  yes 
2010  Korea  first  second        no  no 
World Exhibitions                 
1998  Canada  second          no  no 
2000  Canada  second          no  yes 
2005  Canada  second          no  yes 
2010  Korea  second  second  second  second    no  no 
World Football Cups                 
2006  South Africa  second  second  second      no  no ￿ ￿￿
Table 4 
Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: winning countries 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date and cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAR) for several other event windows around the announcement 
day.  Abnormal  returns are  constant-mean  and risk-adjusted returns.  Model parameters  were 
estimated regressing market index returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -20] 
in event time.  1 q  and  2 q  are the Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test statistics, without and 
with crude dependence adjustment.  1 t  is the z-statistic for the sign test. 
a , 
b and 
c  denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.6869  -0.0802  0.7956  -1.1199  0.3492  -0.2030  0.4678  -2.0425 
1 q   (0.477)  (-0.167)  (0.828)  (-0.389)  (0.232)  (-0.405)  (0.466)  (-0.678) 

















#  Positive AR  3  3  3  3  2  3  2  2 
1 t   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (-0.816)  (0.000)  (-0.816)  (-0.816) 
 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
8 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
















1 q   (-0.163)  (-0.894)  (-0.385)  (0.077)  (-0.573)  (-1.255)  (-1.088)  (0.018) 
2 q   (-0.150)  (-0.821)  (-0.353)  (0.071)  (-0.598)  (-1.310)  (-1.136)  (0.018) 
#  Positive AR  4  2  3  3  4  3  3  3 
1 t   (0.000)  (-1.414)  (-0.707)  (-0.707)  (0.000)  (-0.707)  (-0.707)  (-0.707) 
 ￿ ￿￿
Table 4 (ctd.) 
Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date 
 
PANEL C. World Football Cups 
6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -0.2937  -0.0248  -0.2027  -0.8063  -0.3328  -0.1635  -0.0706  -0.7306 
1 q   (-0.239)  (-0.060)  (-0.247)  (-0.328)  (-0.243)  (-0.358)  (-0.077)  (-0.267) 
2 q   (-0.237)  (-0.060)  (-0.245)  (-0.325)  (-0.227)  (-0.335)  (-0.072)  (-0.249) 
#  Positive 
AR  3  3  2  2  3  2  4  2 
1 t   (0.000)  (0.000)  (-0.816)  (-0.816)  (0.000)  (-0.816)  (0.816)  (-0.816) 
 
 
PANEL D. European Football Cups 
                    10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.3847  -0.2258  0.1807  0.3968  0.2104  -0.1793  -0.0356  0.3472 
1 q   (0.457)  (-0.804)  (0.322)  (0.236)  (0.213)  (-0.544)  (-0.054)  (0.176) 
2 q   (0.396)  (-0.697)  (0.279)  (0.204)  (0.190)  (-0.485)  (-0.048)  (0.156) 
#  Positive 
AR  7  4  7  5  5  4  4  6 
1 t   (1.265)  (-0.632)  (1.265)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (-0.632)  (-0.632)  (0.632) 
 
PANEL E. World Exhibitions 
11 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -0.6108  -0.2423  -0.4596  -0.3447  -0.4180  -0.1325  -0.3484  -0.4618 
1 q   (-0.683)  (-0.812)  (-0.771)  (-0.193)  (-0.439)  (-0.417)  (-0.548)  (-0.242) 
2 q   (-0.689)  (-0.820)  (-0.778)  (-0.195)  (-0.460)  (-0.438)  (-0.575)  (-0.254) 
#  Positive 
AR  3  3  4  4  5  4  5  4 
1 t   (-1.508)  (-1.508)  (-0.905)  (-0.905)  (-0.302)  (-0.905)  (-0.302)  (-0.905) 
 ￿ ￿￿
Table 4 (ctd.) 
Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date 
 
PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions 
10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.4678  0.2475  0.6002  0.2300  0.2591  0.2147  0.5925  -0.1793 
1 q   (0.589)  (0.935)  (1.134)  (0.145)  (0.307)  (0.762)  (1.052)  (-0.106) 
2 q   (0.658)  (1.045)  (1.267)  (0.162)  (0.351)  (0.872)  (1.203)  (-0.121) 
#  Positive 
AR  7  7  8  8  6  8  7  7 




  (0.632)  (1.897)
c
  (1.265)  (1.265) 
 
 
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
30 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -0.6067  -0.1695  -0.1401  -0.4299  -0.9455  -0.1988  -0.1968  -0.5455 
1 q   (-1.114)  (-0.933)  (-0.386)  (-0.395)  (-1.607)  (-1.013)  (-0.502)  (-0.463) 
2 q   (-0.838)  (-0.702)  (-0.290)  (-0.297)  (-1.106)  (-0.698)  (-0.345)  (-0.319) 
#  Positive 
AR  11  14  16  14  10  14  15  13 
1 t   (-1.461)  (-0.365)  (0.365)  (-0.365)  (-1.826)
c
  (-0.365)  (0.000)  (-0.730) ￿ ￿￿
Table 5  
Industry abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: winning 
countries 
This table reports industry average abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date, and day of 
the announcement and next day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR). # denotes the 
number of markets used to compute the industry average abnormal returns. Abnormal returns 
are  constant-mean  and  risk-adjusted  returns.  Model  parameters  were  estimated  regressing 
market index returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -20] in event time. The 
table shows the abnormal returns for the industries that a priori would benefit more from the 
event. The last row shows the global average AR and CAR across all industries (up to 32). In 




c  denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
for bilateral tests. 
 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games   
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 








































































PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 















































































Table 5 (ctd.) 
Industry abnormal returns at and around the announcement date 
 
PANEL C. World Football Cups 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 






































































PANEL D. European Football Cups 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 







































































Table 5 (ctd.) 
Industry abnormal returns at and around the announcement date 
 
PANEL E. World Exhibitions 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 





































































PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 





































































Table 5 (ctd.) 
Industry abnormal returns at and around the announcement date 
 
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 




































































Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: losing countries 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date and cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAR) for several other event windows around the announcement 
day.  Abnormal  returns are  constant-mean  and risk-adjusted returns.  Model parameters  were 
estimated regressing market index returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -20] 
in event time.  1 q  and  2 q  are the Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test statistics, without and 
with crude dependence adjustment.  1 t  is the z-statistic for the sign test. 
a , 
b and 
c  denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
5 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -1.1602  -0.0967  -1.0230  0.5208  2.2832  0.9738  0.1149  -2.4676 
1 q   (-0.785)  (-0.196)  (-1.039)  (0.176)  (0.996)  (1.274)  (0.075)  (-0.538) 
2 q   (-0.570)  (-0.143)  (-0.754)  (0.128)  (0.978)  (1.251)  0.074)  (-0.529) 
#  Positive AR 
2  3  2  3  4  4  2  3 
1 t   (-0.447)  (0.447)  (-0.447)  (0.447  (1.342  (1.342)  (-0.447  (0.447) 
 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
5 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.5074  0.2802  -0.0160  0.5253  0.8870  0.6367  0.2619  0.7717 
1 q   (0.313)  (0.518)  (-0.015)  (0.162)  (0.514)  (1.106)  (0.227)  (0.223) 
2 q   (0.321)  (0.532)  (-0.015)  (0.166)  (0.518)  (1.116)  (0.229)  (0.225) 
#  Positive AR 
2  3  3  1  2  4  4  2 
1 t   (-0.447)  (0.447)  (0.447)  (-1.342)  (-0.447)  (1.342)  (1.342)  (-0.447) ￿ ￿￿
Table 6 (ctd.) 
Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: losing countries 
 
 
PANEL C. World Exhibitions 
4  countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.4727  0.1898  0.3343  0.9237  0.0798  0.5230  0.0517  0.3347 
1 q   (0.803)  (0.968)  (0.852)  (0.785)  (0.046)  (0.896)  (0.044)  (0.096) 
2 q   (0.791)  (0.953)  (0.839)  (0.773)  (0.044)  (0.866)  (0.043)  (0.092) 
#  Positive AR 
3  3  3  4  2  4  2  3 
1 t   (1.000)  (1.000)  (1.000)  (2.000)
b   (0.000)  (2.000)
b   (0.000)  (1.000) 
 
PANEL D. World Football Cups (South Africa) 
                  1 country 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.9040  0.4095  0.6283  0.5535  0.1536  -0.073  -0.493  1.4042 
 
 ￿ ￿￿
Table 7  
Cross-sectional regressions 
This table reports GLS regressions estimates with host country industry cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR[0,1] as the dependent variable. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. SIZE 
is the ratio between the event capital expenditure and the host country GDP; LAG is the time lag 
between the announcement and the moment of the event; LIQ is the ratio between of the country 
market capitalization and GDP; REC is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in recession at 
the time of the event and 0 otherwise; EXP is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in 
expansion at the time of the event and 0 otherwise; REP is the weight of the industry market 
capitalization in aggregate market capitalization; VOT is the difference in the percentage of 
votes between the winning and the losing country with the largest number of votes in the last 
round. D_SOG. D_WOG. D_WFC. D_WE and D_EE are the dummies for the type of event 
(Summer Olympic Games, Winter Olympic Games, World Exhibitions and World Specialized 
Exhibitions).  The  last  two  rows  report,  respectively,  the  number  of  observations  and  the 
adjusted  R




c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral 
tests. 
 
js k k D k j VOT 7 js REP 6 j EXP 5 j REC 4 js LIQ 3 j LAG 2 j SIZE 1 0 js CAR h g b b b b b b b b + ￿ + + + + + + + + + =     
Independent variables  Coefficients of industry fixed effects 
regression models 


























































































Table 8  
Partial Anticipation Model  I - Estimated Parameters  
This table reports OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over the event day and next-
day CAR[0,1] for winning and losing countries. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. p 
is defined as the probability of country hosting the event and is given by the percentage of votes 
received by the country in the last round of voting; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
country is nominated and 0 otherwise. The table also reports the number of observations and the 
adjusted R
2. The last row shows the p-values for linear tests of significance for the parameters. 
Estimates are multiplied by 100. 
a ,
band 
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels for bilateral tests. 
 
i i D i p i CAR m d f a + + + =  
 
PANEL A. Unbalanced panel 






























p-value (Wald test) 
d a =   (0.580) 
 
PANEL B. Balanced panel  

























Null Hypothesis  p-value (Wald test) 
d a =   (0.987) ￿ ￿￿
Table 9  
Partial Anticipation Model  II - Estimated Parameters  
This table reports OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over the event day and next-
day CAR[0.1] for winning and losing countries. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. 
PS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are a partial surprise  and 0 
otherwise; TS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are an almost 
total  surprise  and  0  otherwise;  and  D  is  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  the  country  is 
nominated and 0 otherwise. The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted 
R
2. The last rows show the p-values for several tests of significance for the sum of parameters. 
Estimates are multiplied by 100. 
a ,
b and
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels for bilateral tests. 
i i TS i D 2 i PS i D 1 i D 0 i TS 2 i PS 1 0 w l l l j j j + + + + + + = ￿ ￿￿￿  
PANEL A. Unbalanced panel  


































































   (0.002)
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Table 9 (ctd.) 
Partial Anticipation Model  II - Estimated Parameters  
 
PANEL B. Balanced panel  



























































































The table below shows the announcement dates for the mega-events analysed.  
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1960  Italy  (Rome)  16-May-1955 
1964  Japan (Tokyo)  26-May-1959 
1968  México (Mexico City)  18-Oct-1963 
1972  Germany (Munich)  26-Apr-1966 
1976  Canada (Montreal)  13-May-1970 
1980  Soviet Union (Moscow)  23-Oct-1974 
1984  USA (Los Angeles)  18-May -1978 
1988  South Korea (Seoul)  30-Sep-1981 
1992  Spain (Barcelona)  17-Oct-1986 
1996  USA (Atlanta)  18-Sept1990 
2000  Australia (Sydney)  23-Sep-1993 
2004  Greece (Athens)  05-Sep-1997 
2008  China (Beijing)  13-July-2001 
Source: International Olympic Committee 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1960  USA (Squaw Valley)  14-June-1955 
1964  Austria (Innsbruck)  25-May -1959 
1968  France (Grenoble)  28-May-1964 
1972  Japan (Sapporo)  26-Apr-1966 
1976  Austria (Innsbruck)  04-Feb-1973 
1980  EUA (Lake Placid)  23-Oct-1974 
1984  Yugoslavia (Sarajevo)  18-May-1978 
1988  Canada (Calgary)  30-Sep-1981 
1992  France (Albertville)  17-Oct-1986 
1994  Norway (Lillehammer)  15-Sep-1988 
1998  Japan (Nagano)  15-Jun-1991 
2002  EUA (Salt Lake City)  16-Jun-1995 
2006  Italy (Turin)  19-Jun-1999 
2010  Canada (Vancouver)  02-Jul-2003 
Source: International Olympic Committee 
 ￿ ￿￿
Table A1 (ctd.) 
Announcement Dates 
PANEL C. World Football Cups 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1970  México  08-Oct-1964 
1974  Germany  08-Jul-1966 
1978  Argentina  08-Jul-1966 
1982  Spain  08-Jul-1966 
1986  Mexico  20-May -1983 
1990  Italy  19-May-1984 
1994  USA  4-Jul-1988 
1998  France  2-Jul-1992 
2002  Japan/South Korea  31-May -1996 
2006  Germany  06-Jul-2000 
Source: FIFA. 
PANEL D. European Football Cups 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1976  Yugoslavia  27-Jan-1976 
1980  Italy  12-Nov-1977 
1984  France  10-Dec-1981 
1988  Germany  14-Mar-1985 
1992  Sweden  16-Dec-1988 
1996  England  05-May-1992 
2000  Belgium / Netherlands  31-Mar -1995 
2004  Portugal  12-Oct-1999 
2008  Austria / Switzerland  12-Dec-2002 
Source: UEFA. ￿ ￿￿
Table A1 (ctd.) 
Announcement Dates 
PANEL E. World and Specialized Exhibitions 
Event Year  Universal/World 
/Specialized 
Host Country  Announcement Date 
1970  U  Japan (Osaka)  14-Set-1965 
1972  S  Netherlands (Amsterdam)  21-Mar-1968 
1973  S  Germany (Hamburg)  06-May-1969 
1974  S  Austria (Vienna)  16-Jun-1969 
1974  U  USA (Spokane)  16-Feb-1971 
1975  U  Japan (Okinawa)  24-Mar-1972 
1980  S  Canada (Montreal)  14-Feb-1979 
1981  S  Bulgaria (Plovdiv)  06-Jun1980 
1982  S  Netherlands (Amsterdam)  16-Feb-1979 
1982  U  USA (Knoxville)  15-Abr-1977 
1983  S  Germany (Munich)  21-Aug-1979 
1984  S  England (Liverpool)  09-Feb-1982 
1984  W  USA (New Orleans)  12-Jun-1980 
1985  W  Japan (Tsukuba)  26-Nov-1980 
1985  W  Bulgaria (Plovdiv)  30-May-1984 
1986  W  Canada (Vancouver)  12-Oct-1980 
1988  W  Australia (Brisbane)  15-Jun-1983 
1990  S  Japan (Osaka)  26-May-1986 
1992  W  Spain (Seville)  8-Dec-1982 
1992  S  Italy (Genoa)  18-Jun-1982 
1992  S  New Zeland (Haye-Z.)  25-Nov-1986 
1993  S  Germany (Stuttgart)  25-May-1989 
1993  W  South Korea (Taejon)  14-Jun-1990 
1998  W  Portugal (Lisbon)  23-Jun-1992 
1999  S  China (Kunming)  4-Dec-1994 
2000  W  Germany (Hanover)  14-Jun-1990 
2002  S  Netherlands (Haarlemmer)  15-Jun-1995 
2003  S  Germany (Rostock)  13-Dec-1995 
2005  W  Japan (Aichi)  12-Jun-1997 
2010  W  China (Shanghai)  03-Dec-2002 
Source: Bureau International de Expositions (BIE). ￿ ￿￿
Table A1 (ctd.) 
Announcement Dates 
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1985  Greece (Athens)  22-Nov-1984 
1986  Italy (Florence) 
1987  Netherlands (Amsterdam) 
1988  Germany (Berlin) 
1989  France (Paris) 
28-May-1985 
1990  Scotland (Glasgow)  13-Nov-1986 
1992  Spain (Madrid) 
1993  France (Anvers) 
27-May-1988 
1991  Ireland (Dublin) 
1994  Portugal (Lisbon) 
1995  Luxemburg (Luxemburg) 
1996  Denmark (Copenhagen) 
18-May-1989 
1997  Greece (Thessaloniki)  18-May-1992 
1998  Sweden (Stockholm) 
1999  Germany (Weimar) 
05-Nov-1993 
2000 
France (Avignon); Norway (Bergen); Italy 
(Bologna); Belgium (Brussels); Poland 
(Kracovia); Czech Rep. (Prague); Finland 
(Helsinki); Spain (Santiago Compostela);Island 
(Reykjavik) 
20-Nov-1995 
2001  Netherlands (Rotterdam); Portugal (Porto) 
2002  Belgium (Bruges); Spain (Salamanca) 
2003  Austria (Graz) 
2004  France (Lille); Italy (Genoa) 
28-May-1998 
2005  Ireland (Cork)  7-May-2002 
2006  Greece (Patras)  6 –May-2003 




Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
This table reports, for each market, the abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for several other event windows after the announcement 
day. Abnormal returns are constant-mean and risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were 
estimated regressing market index returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -
20]  in  event  time  t-statistics  are  shown  in  parentheses. 
a ,
b  and 
c   denote  statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
                         6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 




























































































Individual Market Abnormal Returns (ctd.) 
 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
                         8 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 






















































































































Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
 
PANEL C. World Football Cups 
                         6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
























































































Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
PANEL D. European Football Cups 
                         10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
ITALY 
























































































































































Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
 
PANEL E. World Exhibitions 
                         11 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
USA 

































































































































































 ￿ ￿￿ ￿
Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions 
                         10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
         CANADA 












































































































































Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns  
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
                         30 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
ITALY 














































































































































































































































Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture (cont.) 
                         30 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 















































































































































































































This table shows descriptive statistics of the events. SIZE is the ratio between the event 
capital  expenditure  and  the  host  country  GDP;  LAG  is  the  time  lag  between  the 
announcement and the moment of the event (number of months); VOT is the difference in the 
percentage of votes between the winning and the losing country with the largest number of 
votes in the last round. # denotes the number of events used to computed the cross-sectional 
statistics. 
PANEL A. All events (#32)   
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE   0.0124  0.0017  0.0000  0.1056  0.0245 
LAG   68.7  70.5  13  120  23.1 
VOT  56.3%  38.7%  2.3%  100.0%  42.1% 
PANEL B. Summer Olympic Games (#6)          
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE    0.0326  0.0170  0.0005  0.1056  0.0021 
LAG     77.5  78.5  69.0  85.0  7.3 
VOT     32.7%  27.5%  2.3%  88.2%  29.3% 
PANEL C. Winter Olympic Games (#8) 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE    0.0110  0.0024  0.0001  0.0725  0.0022 
LAG     69.1  70.5  64.0  77.0  4.5 
VOT     28.8%  20.3%  2.8%  100.0%  32.1% 
PANEL D. World Football Cups (#5)* 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
VOT   34.7%  26.3%  4.3%  100.0%  39.1% 
*only 1 included in the cross-sectional regressions and used to compute the statistics in PANEL A. 
PANEL E. World Exhibitions (#10) 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE  (#1)  0.0102  0.0014  0.0000  0.0475  0.0023 
LAG (#1)     76.2  69.0  38.0  124.0  29.6 
VOT (#6)    66.9%  100.0%  2.5%  100.0%  43.4% 
PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions (#7) 
  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE    0.0010  0.0003  0.0000  0.0057  0.0021 
LAG   49.3  47.0  13.0  88.0  27.7 
VOT  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  0.0% ￿ ￿￿￿
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￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ - ￿, ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’: ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 4￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿
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￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, # ￿3 # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿: & ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’+ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ 4
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿& < * ￿
￿ ￿￿= ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿, ￿" ￿ & ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿# ￿’ # ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’* ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿> ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿? ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿@ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿A ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿" ￿ & ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿ : & ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ # ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’B ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿" ￿ & ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿
<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿, & + ￿ ￿ ￿￿’+ ￿￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿, ￿" ￿ & ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ , & + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ <￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’+ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’: ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ B ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
" ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿￿ , ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ - ￿, ￿" ￿ & ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6   ￿
" ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ￿3 ￿ ￿ @ & ￿ A ￿ B￿ A ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿, & + ￿ ￿ ￿￿’) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿C ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿, ￿" ￿ & ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿￿￿￿￿6 -￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;￿ ￿ ;$ ￿ & + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ + 9 ￿ ;7 ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’" ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿C ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿! ￿, ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 . ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , & + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’( ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ / ￿￿ ￿4￿￿4￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ - ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿, ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 1 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ C ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, # 3 # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 4￿￿￿￿￿￿! ￿￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿; ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ - ￿, ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, & + ￿ ￿ ￿￿’* ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿: ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿+ ￿ ￿ ￿
/ ￿$ 4￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿D￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿, ￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, # ￿3 # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’( ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿! ￿, ￿￿￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 6 ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , # ￿ 3 # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿) * ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿￿￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿6 ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , & + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿4￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿= ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ * ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿C ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿E F ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿   ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , # 3 # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ D￿ ￿￿￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ -￿
" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ;￿ ￿ ;$ ￿ & + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ + 9 ￿ ;7 ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿C ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ & 0 ￿ ￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿" ￿ ￿ 9 ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ? / ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿ ￿￿, ￿" ￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿’ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 1 ￿
3 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ # ￿ , & + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿ - ￿￿’ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
3 ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ # ￿ , & + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ = ￿￿￿- ￿￿
’ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
<￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿7 # ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿: ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿$ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 6 ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿D￿ & & ￿ ￿ ￿￿= ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
, ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿: ￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿4￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿4
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿’ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, # 3 # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿G ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿H 7 ￿ I J 4￿ 9 9 J K ￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ " ￿D￿￿% ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿$ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿￿￿￿E F ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿
$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿3 ￿ ￿ E ￿, & + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿! 4$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿￿ ￿ -￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿